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Lacey Cochrane

@NullVectorX
USTrusted contributorCompletionist
11 followers159 downloads2,514 copies56 likes67,916 views

245 detections

Detects successful Kerberos PKINIT authentication (Event 4768, PreAuthType 16) issued by on-premises certificate authorities. This activity is a potential indicator of Shadow Credentials or Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) abuse where attackers use forged or stolen certificates to authenticate as domain users or machines.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
22012
Detects unauthorized modifications to Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) template objects (pKICertificateTemplate) using Windows Event ID 5136. This behavior is indicative of ESC4-style attacks, where an adversary with write access to a certificate template modifies security descriptors, enrollment rights, or sensitive configuration flags (like enabling enrollee-supplied SANs or adding a Client Authentication EKU) to facilitate privilege escalation or persistence.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
15015
Monitors Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) for an unusual volume of certificate requests from a single requester within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of enumeration or exploitation activity by tools such as Certify or Certipy, which often perform rapid certificate requests to identify vulnerable templates or request certificates for unauthorized identities.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
9014
Detects successful logon events (Event ID 4624) utilizing Schannel (TLS client certificate) or PKU2U (peer authentication) logon processes. This behavior may indicate an attacker using forged or stolen certificates to authenticate against a system, potentially bypassing Kerberos-based authentication monitoring.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
1309
Detects unauthorized remote write operations (via SMB, Named Pipes, or TCP) to the Windows Certificate Services CertLog directory (C:\Windows\System32\CertLog\). This directory contains sensitive CA database, transaction logs, and checkpoint files. Any modification by a process other than the legitimate certsvc.exe is indicative of potential CA database tampering, malicious log manipulation, or anti-forensics activity.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
209
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests that utilize NTLM authentication rather than Kerberos. This behavior is indicative of potential NTLM relay attacks (ESC8), where an attacker forces a machine account to authenticate to the AD CS web enrollment endpoint via NTLM to obtain a certificate on behalf of that machine.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
18011
Detects Kerberos TGT requests (Event ID 4768) that utilize RC4 (PreAuthType 23) for pre-authentication. This is a common indicator of an Overpass-the-Hash attack, where an adversary uses a stolen NTLM hash to authenticate as a user and request a Kerberos ticket in environments that are typically configured for AES encryption.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
6307
Detects Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificate requests where the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contains a User Principal Name (UPN) that does not match the requester's identity. This pattern indicates potential exploitation of ESC1 or ESC6 certificate template misconfigurations, allowing an attacker to request certificates for arbitrary identities.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
808
Detects NTLM network logons (NtLmSsp) for accounts that may have been targets of certificate-based identity abuse (e.g., ESC1). Attackers often leverage this technique to extract NTLM hashes from PKINIT TGT PACs and subsequently utilize Pass-the-Hash for lateral movement within the network.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
205
Detects anomalous login activity in Google Workspace characterized by a high volume of login failures (5 or more) originating from a single IP address. The rule identifies potential brute force or credential stuffing campaigns and flags instances where a successful login occurs following a burst of failure events from the same source.
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Lacey Cochrane@NullVectorX
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XQL Threat Forge
2 months ago
107
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