ReversingLabs Yara
@ReversingLabsYara3 followers8,019 downloads10 copies0 likes9,096 views
616 detections
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This rule detects the DenizKizi ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file finding, file encryption, and shadow copy deletion routines. The rule requires all three sets of byte patterns to be present in a file for a match, reducing false positives.
This Yara rule detects the DesuCrypt ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file enumeration, encryption, and network share discovery functionalities. The rule looks for three distinct sets of byte sequences, all of which must be present in a file for a detection to occur. These patterns likely correspond to core functions within the ransomware's executable code.
This rule detects the Dharma ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within the executable. The patterns indicate functionalities related to file searching, encryption routines, and enumeration of network shares, which are characteristic behaviors of Dharma ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the DirtyDecrypt ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns (signatures) within the executable. The rule looks for a combination of patterns related to entry point code, hashing functions, key management (get, destroy, import), and encryption/decryption routines, as well as a specific pattern named 'mrwhite'. The presence of these combined patterns indicates the file is likely the DirtyDecrypt ransomware.
This rule detects the District ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption routines, file discovery mechanisms, and resource enumeration functions. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns within executable files to identify potential District ransomware samples.
This Yara rule detects the Erica ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within its executable code. The rule looks for patterns associated with file encryption routines and file discovery mechanisms, indicating the presence of the Erica ransomware.
This Yara rule detects the FCT ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file finding and encryption routines. The rule looks for a combination of patterns related to how the ransomware locates files on a system and subsequently encrypts them. The `uint16(0) == 0x5A4D` condition ensures that the rule only applies to valid Windows executable files (MZ header).
This YARA rule detects the FLKR ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within its executable code. The rule uses three distinct byte sequences ($search_and_encrypt_p1, $search_and_encrypt_p2, $search_and_encrypt_p3) that are characteristic of the ransomware's search and encryption routines. The condition `uint16(0) == 0x5A4D` ensures that the scanned file is a valid Windows executable (MZ header), and `all of ($search_and_encrypt_p*)` requires all three byte patterns to be present for a match, reducing false positives.
This YARA rule detects the FenixLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte sequences ($encrypt_files_1, $encrypt_files_2, $encrypt_files_3, $encrypt_files_4, $encrypt_files_5) within executable files. The rule requires the presence of the MZ header (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D) indicating a Windows executable, along with a combination of these byte sequences to trigger. The identified byte sequences are indicative of the ransomware's file encryption routines.
This Yara rule detects the Ferrlock ransomware based on specific byte sequences found within its executable code. The rule looks for patterns related to file searching, resource enumeration, test file creation, and file encryption, indicating the presence of the Ferrlock ransomware.
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