ReversingLabs Yara
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This YARA rule detects the Satan ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its core functionalities. These functionalities include establishing remote connections, searching for processes, encrypting files, and searching for files in specific folders. The rule combines these patterns to increase confidence in detection.
This YARA rule detects the Satana ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file encryption routines, file searching mechanisms, and remote connection capabilities. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes ($encrypt_files_p1, $encrypt_files_p2) indicative of how the ransomware encrypts files, patterns related to how it searches for files ($search_files_p1, $search_files_p2), and byte sequences involved in establishing remote connections ($remote_connection). The rule requires the presence of the remote connection patterns, along with all file searching and file encryption patterns, to trigger a detection, ensuring a high confidence in identifying Satana ransomware.
This YARA rule detects the Sepsis ransomware by identifying specific byte sequences related to its file searching and encryption routines. The rule looks for distinct patterns in the executable code that are characteristic of Sepsis ransomware's functionality.
This rule detects the Serpent ransomware based on specific byte patterns found in its executable code. The patterns indicate functionalities related to DLL manipulation and thread creation, file enumeration and searching, and establishing remote connections, including FTP. The rule specifically targets the Serpent ransomware family.
This rule detects the SevenSevenSeven ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within the executable. It looks for distinct code sequences related to file searching, encryption routines, and remote server communication, which are characteristic of this particular ransomware family. The rule requires the presence of all file search patterns and a combination of either the first set of encryption and remote server patterns or the second set.
This YARA rule detects the Sherminator ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its resource enumeration, file finding, and file encryption functions. The rule looks for distinct sequences of bytes within the executable, indicating the presence of Sherminator's core malicious functionalities. The condition `uint16(0) == 0x5A4D` ensures that the rule only applies to valid Windows Portable Executable (PE) files.
This rule detects the Sifrelendi ransomware based on specific byte patterns found within the executable. The rule looks for two distinct sets of byte sequences, '$search_files' and '$encrypt_files', which are indicative of the ransomware's file searching and encryption routines. The rule also verifies that the file is a Windows executable by checking for the 'MZ' header (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D).
This YARA rule detects the Sigrun ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its file enumeration and encryption routines. The rule looks for a combination of patterns related to finding files, encrypting files (three distinct sets of patterns), and enumerating resources (two distinct sets of patterns). All identified patterns must be present for a match, along with the standard PE file magic number (MZ header).
This Yara rule detects the Spora ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns related to its core functionalities. These functionalities include routines for encrypting files, creating key files, generating encryption keys, and enumerating resources on the system. The rule looks for a combination of these patterns to ensure high confidence in detection.
This YARA rule detects the TBLocker ransomware by identifying specific byte patterns within the executable. It looks for distinct sequences of bytes associated with the ransomware's main functions, including those responsible for searching and encrypting files. The rule requires all parts of the main ransomware function patterns, along with the file search and encryption patterns, to be present in a PE (Portable Executable) file (indicated by `uint16(0) == 0x5A4D`) to trigger a detection.
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