
Rudra Verma
@RudravermaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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111 detections
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This rule detects potential C2 beaconing behavior by identifying devices that make a high number of periodic outbound connections (20 or more within an hour) to a single external IP address on common web and C2-related ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443, 4444, 5555, 8888, 9001). The rule summarizes these connections by device, remote IP, and initiating process, highlighting sustained communication patterns indicative of command and control.
This rule detects attempts to grant consent to OAuth applications, which could indicate an illicit consent grant attack. It specifically looks for successful operations related to consenting to applications, adding app role assignments to service principals, adding delegated permission grants, or adding OAuth2PermissionGrants within audit logs. The rule extracts details such as the target application, the user who consented, their initiating IP address, and the permissions granted.
This rule detects a high volume of Azure resource deletions by a single user within a short timeframe (30 minutes). This behavior is indicative of a destructive attack or wiper activity, where an adversary attempts to delete critical cloud infrastructure to disrupt operations or cause data loss. The rule specifically looks for 'delete' operations that were successful and counts them per caller and IP address, triggering an alert if the count exceeds a defined threshold.
This rule detects potential MFA push fatigue attacks by identifying a high volume of failed multi-factor authentication challenges for a single user within a short time window. It aggregates sign-in logs, specifically looking for result types indicative of MFA failures, and alerts if a user receives more than a defined threshold of MFA challenges within a 30-minute period.
This rule detects a potential quishing (QR code phishing) attack followed by a suspicious successful sign-in to Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). It correlates URL click events or device network events containing deep link indicators (like 'tg://login', 'wa.me/settings/linked_devices', 'signal://', 'line://') or '.apk' file downloads with a successful Entra ID sign-in by the same user within a 30-minute window. This behavior suggests a user may have scanned a malicious QR code, clicked a phishing link, or downloaded a malicious application, leading to a successful but potentially compromised authentication.
This rule detects potential brute force login attempts against Windows systems by monitoring Windows Security Event ID 4625 (failed logon attempts). It aggregates failed attempts by IP address and computer within a 15-minute window and triggers an alert if the number of failed attempts exceeds a defined threshold (default 10). This indicates an adversary systematically guessing passwords to gain unauthorized access.
This rule detects password spraying attacks where a single IP address attempts to authenticate against multiple unique user accounts within a specified time window, resulting in failed sign-in attempts. It specifically looks for a high number of unique users failing authentication from the same IP, which is characteristic of password spraying to avoid account lockouts.
This rule detects when multi-factor authentication (MFA) or strong authentication settings are disabled or removed for a user account. It specifically looks for successful audit log entries related to operations such as 'Disable Strong Authentication', 'Update user', 'Update StsRefreshTokensValidFrom', 'Admin registered security info', or 'Admin deleted security info'. This activity could indicate an adversary attempting to maintain persistent access to a compromised account by weakening its authentication requirements.
This rule detects potential DNS tunneling or data exfiltration by identifying high volumes of DNS queries with unusually long subdomains from a single process on a device. It aggregates DNS connection inspection events, extracts the subdomain length, and then summarizes the count of queries, unique domains, and average subdomain length within a 10-minute window. An alert is triggered if the query count exceeds 100 or if more than 50 unique domains are observed, combined with subdomain lengths greater than 30 characters.
This rule detects high-volume access to Azure Key Vault secrets, keys, or certificates within a one-hour window. It specifically looks for successful read operations on secrets, keys, and certificates, as well as modifications to access policies. A high volume (more than 10 accesses) from a single caller within an hour is flagged as potential credential harvesting.
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