Ankit Mehta
@SecvynIndiaTrusted contributorCompletionist
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8,664 detections
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Detects the execution of the Mimikatz tool or the usage of specific command-line arguments associated with common credential dumping and persistence techniques, such as Skeleton Key or LSASS patching.
Detects successful NTLMv1 logon events (Event ID 4624) where the logon type is 3 (Network). NTLMv1 is a legacy and insecure authentication protocol. Its use in a modern environment, particularly for network logons, is often associated with pass-the-hash attacks or legacy compatibility issues that attackers may exploit.
Detects instances of FTP transfer mode switching (ASCII/Binary) by monitoring network events for FTP traffic on port 21 and specific commands like 'TYPE A' or 'TYPE I' in the RemoteUrl. This behavior can be indicative of data transfer activities, potentially related to vulnerabilities or malicious data exfiltration.
Detects potential exploitation attempts related to the Squidbleed vulnerability by monitoring 'squid.exe' process command lines for indicators of ASAN (AddressSanitizer) heap overflow reports. This includes keywords like '==', 'ERROR', 'ERROR SUMMARY', and 'SUMMARY', which are often present in ASAN crash reports.
Detects potential browser fingerprinting and network reconnaissance behavior associated with Bluekit BitM PhaaS campaigns. The rule correlates large suspicious JavaScript file downloads (excluding common CDNs) with STUN server connectivity within a 10-minute window, a pattern often used by adversary-in-the-middle (AiTM) frameworks to fingerprint victims and establish WebRTC channels.
This rule detects successful configuration modifications to diagnostic settings or storage services where the destination resource is identified as being outside of the organization's trusted subscriptions or expected storage naming conventions. This activity may indicate an adversary attempting to exfiltrate logs or data to an attacker-controlled storage account.
Detects the execution of the 'unshare' utility with arguments that create new user, network, and mount namespaces (-U, -n, -r) by a non-root user. This technique is often used to bypass namespace restrictions or perform privilege escalation by gaining elevated capabilities within a new, user-controlled namespace.
Detects the use of the built-in Windows tool 'ntdsutil.exe' to perform an Install from Media (IFM) operation, which creates a copy of the Active Directory database (NTDS.dit). The rule specifically flags when this output is directed to suspicious paths like 'C:\Windows\Temp' or 'C:\Users\Public', which are common locations used by adversaries to stage files for exfiltration.
This rule detects the creation of shortcut (.lnk) files within the Windows Startup folder initiated by potentially suspicious processes such as WinRAR, unrar, or PowerShell. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to achieve persistence by ensuring the execution of a malicious file upon user login.
This rule detects suspicious PowerShell execution patterns involving scripts or payloads stored within specific directory paths (ProgramData\WC3\ or ProgramData\wt1). It flags instances where PowerShell commands include reflective loading techniques ('IEX' or 'Invoke-Expression') while referencing files in these paths, which is often associated with fileless malware execution or malicious loaders.