Splunk Security
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This analytic detects the execution of `rundll32.exe` with command-line arguments specifically designed to clear the Shimcache (Application Compatibility Cache) by calling `apphelp.dll,ShimFlushCache`. Clearing the Shimcache is an anti-forensic technique used by adversaries to remove forensic artifacts and evade detection, making it harder for incident responders to trace their activities and maintain persistence on a compromised system.
The following analytic detects the creation of a file named "test.txt" within the Windows system directory, indicative of Samsam ransomware propagation. It leverages file-system activity data from the Endpoint data model, specifically monitoring file paths within the Windows System32 directory. This activity is significant as it aligns with known Samsam ransomware behavior, which uses such files for propagation and execution. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to ransomware deployment, resulting in data encryption, system disruption, and potential data loss. Immediate investigation and remediation are crucial to prevent further damage.
The following analytic identifies the execution of a randomly named binary via `services.exe`, indicative of privilege escalation using Cobalt Strike's `svc-exe`. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process lineage and command-line executions. This activity is significant as it often follows initial access, allowing adversaries to escalate privileges and establish persistence. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code, maintain long-term access, and potentially move laterally within the network, posing a severe threat to the organization's security.
The analytic detects the execution of the Microsoft Software Licensing User Interface Tool (`slui.exe`) with elevated privileges using the `-verb runas` function. This activity is identified through logs from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific registry keys and command-line parameters. This behavior is significant as it indicates a potential privilege escalation attempt, which could allow an attacker to gain elevated access and execute malicious actions with higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized system changes, data exfiltration, or further compromise of the affected endpoint.
The analytic detects a suspicious `rundll32.exe` command line used to execute a DLL file, a technique associated with IcedID malware. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions containing the pattern `*/i:*`. This activity is significant as it indicates potential malware attempting to load an encrypted DLL payload, often named `license.dat`. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, leading to further system compromise and potential data exfiltration.
The following analytic identifies the use of the native macOS utility, PlistBuddy, to create or modify property list (.plist) files. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions involving PlistBuddy. This activity is significant because PlistBuddy can be used to establish persistence by modifying LaunchAgents, as seen in the Silver Sparrow malware. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to maintain persistence, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges on the compromised macOS system.
The following analytic identifies a non-lsass.exe process making an outbound connection on port 88, which is typically used by the Kerberos authentication protocol. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and network traffic logs. This activity is significant because, under normal circumstances, only the lsass.exe process should interact with the Kerberos Distribution Center. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could indicate an adversary attempting to abuse the Kerberos protocol, potentially leading to unauthorized access or lateral movement within the network.
The analytic identifies an unusual number of remote authentication attempts from a single source by leveraging Windows Event ID 4624, which logs successful account logons. It uses statistical analysis, specifically the 3-sigma rule, to detect deviations from normal behavior. This activity is significant for a SOC as it may indicate lateral movement, malware staging, or reconnaissance. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to move laterally within the network, escalate privileges, or gather information for further attacks.
The analytic detects the execution of `powershell.exe` with command-line arguments that use PowerShell environment variables to identify the current logged user. This activity is significant as adversaries may use it for situational awareness and Active Directory discovery on compromised endpoints. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to gather critical user information, aiding in further exploitation and lateral movement within the network.
The following analytic detects the execution of VBScript using the wscript.exe application. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because wscript.exe is typically not used to execute VBScript, which is usually associated with cscript.exe. This deviation can indicate an attempt to evade traditional process monitoring and antivirus defenses. If confirmed malicious, this technique could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further lateral movement within the network.
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