Daniel Jeremiah
@daniyyellUnited KingdomTrusted contributorCompletionist
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978 detections
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Detects execution of the login-information extractor SharpGetUserLoginIPRP with embedded user, password, host, and day-range parameters. This tool is known to collect domain logon data.
Detects G2M.exe making external connections shortly after loading a local g2m.dll, providing behavioural confirmation that the trusted binary has been repurposed. This rule specifically looks for network activity from G2M.exe when its process image path is located in suspicious directories like AppData, Temp, Downloads, ProgramData, or Users\Public, indicating potential abuse of a legitimate application.
Correlates an MSI downloaded by a browser with silent msiexec execution on the same device within fifteen minutes. This rule detects potential malicious software installation initiated by a user downloading an MSI package via a web browser, followed by a silent execution of that package using msiexec.exe. This technique is often used by attackers to install malware without user interaction.
Detects a high number of office, PDF, text, and archive files created or renamed in the Downloads or AppData Roaming folders by a single process within a fifteen-minute window. The detection is triggered if either 25 or more files are created/renamed, or if the total size of these files exceeds 500 MB.
Detects a single parent process launching registry or PowerShell queries for both Defender PUA policy and Windows product edition within a ten-minute window. This behavior can indicate malware attempting to understand its environment and potentially evade detection or tailor its execution.
Detects a non-browser mailbox collection or archive utility connecting directly to an IP address while RemoteUrl is empty. This behavior is suspicious as legitimate email clients typically use hostnames. The rule filters out common browsers and svchost.exe and looks for keywords in the command line indicative of mailbox or archive activity (e.g., .pst, .ost, Aspose.Email, mailbox, archive). This suggests an attempt to exfiltrate or collect email data, potentially bypassing DNS resolution for C2 or evasion.
Detects modification of an Azure storage account network rule set to allow public access, bypass trusted-service checks, or add broad network ranges. This could indicate an attacker attempting to gain broader access to sensitive data stored in Azure Storage.
Detects access to Azure App Service Kudu deployment or command endpoints by an identity not normally associated with deployment operations. This could indicate an attacker using compromised credentials to interact with the application's underlying infrastructure.
Detects a new phone, authenticator application, FIDO key, or passkey registered after account recovery activity, which can establish attacker-controlled multifactor authentication.
Detects removal of registered authentication methods shortly after a password reset, a sequence that can prevent the legitimate user from recovering the account. This rule specifically looks for successful 'Delete user authentication method' or 'Remove authentication method' operations in AuditLogs.
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