Daniel Jeremiah
@daniyyellUnited KingdomTrusted contributorCompletionist
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978 detections
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Agent Tesla multi stage campaign hunt KQL Query
This rule set detects indicators of compromise associated with the RESURGE activity targeting Ivanti Connect Secure devices, as described by CISA. It looks for specific file hashes, the presence of a covert socket path (.logsrv), and modifications to key Ivanti filesystem artifacts such as LD_PRELOAD, DSUpgrade.pm, coreboot.img, and scanner.py. A match indicates potential compromise and requires further investigation to confirm the asset role, timing of file appearance, and comparison with approved maintenance windows. If hits are found, collect logs and file copies, reduce external exposure, and look for unusual activity like unexpected administrator actions or unfamiliar outbound connections.
This rule detects activity related to the EmEditor watering hole attack, specifically looking for PowerShell execution making requests to known malicious lookalike domains and network connections to the associated infrastructure. A match suggests a potential download of malicious code during what appeared to be a legitimate install or update. Investigation should focus on identifying the host, user, source of activity, and legitimacy of the install source, followed by evidence preservation, credential reset, and a search for follow-up malicious activity.
This rule detects suspicious activity related to WebView2 processes interacting with AI webchat domains, potentially indicating covert command and control (C2) proxying or other malicious use. It looks for WebView2 traffic to specific AI domains (Grok, Copilot) originating from unusual parent processes, WebView2 access to Grok with URL parameter-driven prompt execution, and suspicious child process execution (cmd.exe, powershell.exe, calc.exe) where WebView2 is the parent process.
This rule detects various indicators associated with a developer-targeting campaign, including Node.js fetching remote JavaScript from untrusted PaaS domains, dynamic loader behavior in next.config.js, repeated beaconing to C2 paths, detached child Node interpreters, directory enumeration and exfiltration behavior, and suspicious access to sensitive files on developer machines.
Detects a command that downloads remote content and immediately runs it with bash. This is a common way to run attacker controlled code on a Linux host.
Detects suspicious Claude Code configuration keys linked to automatic hook execution or automatic MCP server enabling, which were used to bypass consent and execute commands.
This rule detects successful SSH logins for the 'vmanage-admin' user, specifically when publickey authentication is used. This pattern is highlighted as a potential indicator of compromise, especially in the context of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN systems and related vulnerabilities like CVE-2026-20127. The rule aims to flag highly privileged administrative access for review, prompting verification of the source IP address against authorized locations and expected maintenance windows. Unexplained access should be treated as suspicious.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to known threat actor infrastructure associated with FortiGate exploitation, successful administrative or VPN logins to FortiGate devices from these IPs, and DCSync-style directory replication access (EventCode 4662) on Windows systems. The rule is composed of three distinct parts targeting different aspects of the attack chain.
Detects common shell tools accessing OpenClaw plaintext workspace secrets such as the .env file under ~/.openclaw/workspace/.
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