
Duo Tech
@duotechTrusted contributor
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2,481 detections
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This rule monitors audit logs for anomalous OAuth application configurations, specifically focusing on excessive scope counts, Redirect URI mismatches, Client ID mismatches, and cross-client token exchange irregularities, which may indicate malicious OAuth application registration or configuration for token theft.
This rule detects a suspicious sequence of events where a device loads a specific DLL named 'n-ten.dll' and subsequently engages in high-volume network connection activity within a short time window. The rule alerts on endpoints that perform network scanning (defined by a threshold of distinct remote IPs or ports) shortly after the specified module load, which is a common behavior pattern for malicious payloads or backdoors initiating internal reconnaissance or lateral movement.
This rule detects outbound TLS 1.2 traffic communicating over TCP port 99, which is a non-standard port for TLS/HTTPS traffic. This behavior is indicative of potential command-and-control (C2) communication where an adversary is attempting to hide traffic using encryption on an unconventional port.
Detects the execution of PowerShell with specific flags to bypass execution policy and hide the window, commonly used to execute encoded payloads. This rule monitors for PowerShell processes spawned by suspicious parent processes such as 'cmd.exe' or 'ElevatorShellCode.exe' that include parameters like '-ep bypass', '-w hidden', and base64-encoded strings.
Detects the use of PowerShell's .NET WebClient class to download and execute potentially malicious files. The rule monitors for common indicators of in-memory or on-disk file downloading, such as Headers.Add being used to set a User-Agent, and the DownloadData method being invoked. It specifically flags common filenames associated with stage, update, or privilege escalation payloads.
Detects incoming emails identified as phishing attempts by matching specific sender addresses, subjects related to freight/logistics, or embedded URLs and keywords associated with the 'signindat.com' domain.
Detects the use of the schtasks utility to modify and disable scheduled tasks related to Microsoft Windows Defender, specifically the scheduled scan, cache maintenance, and verification tasks. This behavior is indicative of an attempt to impair security defenses on a Windows host.
Detects the dropping of a suspicious DLL file ('abe_decrypt.dll') in a temporary directory, followed by the termination and relaunch of a browser process (Chrome, Edge, or Brave), and the subsequent loading of the same DLL into the browser process, which is highly indicative of browser process injection and DLL hijacking activity.
Detects attempts to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) in PowerShell by invoking memory manipulation techniques. The rule monitors for the usage of 'VirtualProtect', 'GetProcAddress', and 'LoadLibrary' in combination with AMSI-specific strings (e.g., 'AmsiScanBuffer', 'amsi.dll') and the .NET 'Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal' namespace, which are indicative of an in-memory AMSI patch or obfuscation.
Detects the use of 'osascript' to execute AppleScript-based dialog boxes designed to trick users into providing credentials or mimicking system administration prompts. These scripts use labels often associated with fake security or permission requests to harvest passwords.
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