Duo Tech
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2,481 detections
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Detects network connection events where the requested URL contains 'dogleash' and includes common architecture suffixes (mips, arm, x64) or shell script extensions (.sh), often indicative of downloading stage payloads associated with the Dogleash malware family.
Detects the creation or presence of a file named 'svehost.exe' (a common typo-squat for 'svchost.exe') within the 'C:\Users\Public\AppData\Windows' directory. This behavior is indicative of an adversary attempting to masquerade a malicious executable by mimicking a legitimate Windows service process name and placing it in a non-standard, often-abused location.
Detects network traffic associated with Cavern Manticore command-and-control communication. The rule identifies a specific HTTP request pattern characterized by a static User-Agent string resembling a Chrome/Edge browser on Windows and the inclusion of a specific 'X-User-token' header in the HTTP request.
This rule detects suspicious activity associated with the Cavern Manticore threat group, specifically the loading of the 'mhm.dll' module followed by the creation of archive files (.zip, .rar, .7z) within one hour by the same process. This behavior is indicative of data staging for exfiltration, potentially involving DPAPI-protected data.
This rule detects potential brute force authentication attempts via LDAP occurring shortly after a specific DLL (ending in 'ode.dll') is loaded on a system. This behavior may indicate an adversary is using a malicious or secondary module to facilitate credential brute forcing or unauthorized authentication attempts.
Detects the use of taskkill.exe to forcibly terminate a process named 'svehost.exe'. This is often used by adversaries to terminate a process masquerading as a legitimate system process, or potentially an attempt to terminate an impostor service. Note that 'svehost.exe' is a common typo/masquerade for the legitimate 'svchost.exe'.
Detects DNS queries for known typosquatted domains associated with Command and Control (C2) activity. The rule monitors for queries targeting lookalike domains impersonating well-known brands such as Microsoft, Google, Facebook, and various VPN services.
This rule detects HTTP GET requests for specific file paths associated with known malicious lure archives (e.g., YEPlayer.rar, Pis2rayVPN.zip, YEMPlayer.msi). These files are typically used in social engineering campaigns to trick users into downloading and executing malware.
Detects zip archives matching the .zx_ filename prefix convention used by CrashStealer to stage encrypted exfiltration data in /tmp prior to transmission to its C2 server.
Detects the download of a Mach-O executable file over unencrypted HTTP. The rule identifies the Mach-O magic byte header ('CF FA ED FE') within the first few bytes of the HTTP response body, indicating a file download originating from an external network source.
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