Duo Tech
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2,481 detections
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Detects HTTP GET requests to signindat.com for suspected malicious payloads, including executables (.exe) and scripts (.ps1), as well as a decoy PDF document. The rule identifies communication with an external host using generic User-Agent strings, characteristic of the CrySome RAT multi-stage download process.
Detects instances where common scripting or package management tools (e.g., node.exe, python.exe, pip.exe, npm.exe) launch Windows command line interpreters (powershell.exe, cmd.exe, wscript.exe, etc.) with command-line arguments indicative of potentially malicious activity, such as base64-encoded strings, command execution flags, or high-entropy command lines.
This rule detects a suspicious pattern involving mass HTTP scraping behavior (high frequency of requests to numerous distinct remote IP addresses) occurring on the same host, correlated with the creation of multiple new user accounts (Windows Event ID 4720) within the same 30-minute time window. This behavior is indicative of a compromised host being used for automated reconnaissance or data collection alongside persistence mechanism establishment.
Detects the execution of unsigned binaries located in directories typically excluded from EDR/AV scanning, such as Windows Defender folders, security vendor installation directories, and quarantine locations. Attackers utilize these paths to bypass file-system monitoring and on-execute detection by taking advantage of pre-configured security exclusions.
Detects the execution or presence of processes associated with the 'dogleash' tool, specifically identifying command lines or file paths that contain architectural references such as 'mips', 'arm', or 'x64', which is indicative of potential cross-platform malware or backdoor deployment.
This rule detects the execution of Python (pip) or Node.js (npm) package managers with command-line arguments specifying alternative package repositories (e.g., --index-url, --registry) that do not belong to the standard, trusted public repositories (pypi.org or npmjs.com/npmjs.org). This behavior is often indicative of supply chain attacks, where attackers attempt to trick users or automated systems into installing malicious dependencies from compromised or attacker-controlled repositories.
Detects HTTP POST requests to LLM chat completion API endpoints containing keywords associated with phishing kit generation, malware scaffolding, and automated credential harvesting. This behavior is consistent with attackers using LLM-assisted supply chain or phishing campaigns.
Detects usage of pip or npm package managers where non-canonical registry or index URLs are explicitly specified. This behavior can be indicative of software supply chain poisoning, specifically attacks involving typo-squatting or AI-hallucinated malicious package repositories.
This rule detects potential credential harvesting and sensitive data collection activities on macOS by monitoring for access to keychain databases, browser data files (cookies, logins), and shell history files. It looks for both direct file access and the use of the 'security' utility to dump keychain information.
Detects instances where a process opens ntdll.dll directly from the filesystem as a file object. This behavior is indicative of an EDR unhooking technique where an adversary reads a clean, original version of ntdll.dll from disk to overwrite EDR-injected hook bytes in memory, thereby bypassing user-mode monitoring.
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