Duo Tech
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Detects attempts to access browser credential stores or LSASS process memory by unexpected processes. This rule identifies suspicious file access patterns to browser login data files (Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Brave) by non-browser executables, as well as unauthorized access to LSASS process memory via Sysmon Event ID 10 or Windows Security Event 4656 by non-system processes. These activities are indicative of credential dumping or theft.
This rule detects potential phishing or cloaking activity where a web server response contains JavaScript logic that checks the visitor's User-Agent string using 'navigator.userAgent' and conditionally redirects the user via 'window.location'. This technique is commonly used to redirect specific targets (e.g., mobile devices or specific browsers) to malicious sites while serving benign content to others, often for credential harvesting or malware delivery.
This rule detects HTTP POST requests containing common credential field names directed at files ending in .php (such as login.php, result.php, or index.php), which is highly characteristic of phishing kits used to harvest credentials.
This rule detects outbound POST requests to the Telegram Bot API (api.telegram.org) originating from internal network hosts. The detection specifically looks for requests containing the 'sendMessage' path, which is characteristic of bots transmitting stolen data (such as credentials) or command-and-control communication. It focuses on traffic initiated by common command-line tools like 'python-requests' or 'curl', which are frequently abused by automated malware scripts.
Detects the execution of a renamed Windows Address Book (WAB.exe) binary, observed as AdgNsy.exe, originating from an AppData local directory and spawned by WmiPrvSE.exe. This pattern is indicative of AdaptixC2 beaconing activity, leveraging WMI for execution to maintain persistence or conduct remote operations under the guise of a legitimate system utility.
Detects the installation of the Cloudflare Tunnel (cloudflared) utility as a Windows service, often used by threat actors to establish persistent, outbound command-and-control (C2) channels that bypass standard network perimeter controls. This rule monitors for PowerShell-based downloads from GitHub, silent MSI-based installation, and the execution of the 'service install' command.
Detects the execution of 'AdgNsy.exe', a known malicious masquerading process associated with the AdaptixC2 beacon, attempting to scan internal network infrastructure by initiating outbound connections to sensitive ports including SMB (445), RDP (3389), LDAP (389/636), and 9401. This behavior indicates internal reconnaissance for lateral movement.
Detects HTTP GET requests to known malicious infrastructure used in SEO poisoning campaigns to distribute the Bumblebee malware loader. The rule monitors for specific URL paths and hostnames associated with lookalike domains delivering trojanized MSI files.
Detects HTTP traffic patterns associated with LokiBot malware beaconing to a hardcoded command and control (C2) endpoint. The rule specifically looks for established network connections to identified malicious domains or IP addresses using the /fre.php URI path.
Detects the execution of wscript.exe spawning a child powershell.exe process with arguments specifically configured to execute a script file starting with 'ps_' from the 'C:\Temp' directory. This behavior is highly characteristic of JScript droppers commonly associated with malicious email attachments that write and launch secondary payloads silently in the background.
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