Duo Tech
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2,481 detections
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Detects the botking RAT issuing Shell/ShellX/runscript commands that spawn powershell.exe from an implant-named parent process, matching the backdoor's remote command-execution capability.
Detects the ClickFix-style Terminal dropper pattern: zsh/Terminal.app spawning bash with a piped base64-decode or curl-download command redirected through nohup, matching AmnesiaStealer's counterfeit GitHub 'Download for macOS' lure page execution chain.
Detects creation of a macOS LaunchAgent plist referencing a suspicious temp path or unrecognized vendor bundle identifier, consistent with the botking implant's macOS persistence mechanism.
Detects Chrome/Chromium processes launched with the --remote-debugging-port flag (optionally combined with --remote-allow-origins or --headless), enabling Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) session hijacking as used by AmnesiaStealer's streaming module to remotely control an authenticated browser session. Excludes known automation frameworks (Puppeteer, Playwright, Selenium).
This rule detects a multi-stage attack chain characteristic of the WordlistLoader/Amatera malware. It identifies the sequential occurrence of module unhooking (via CreateToolhelp32Snapshot), ETW bypass (via AddVectoredExceptionHandler), and remote process injection (via WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread, etc.) originating from the same process within a 15-minute window.
Correlates a Sysmon DriverLoad event matching known BTR.sys hashes with a subsequent System-process (PID 4) deletion of specific Defender binaries or WdFilter/WinDefend registry keys within a 10-second window — the definitive Defender self-destruction signature of the kernel primitive.
Correlates the hardcoded BootClean.log creation-then-deletion lifecycle (performed by the System process) with a preceding anomalous or hash-matched BTR.sys driver load within a tight time window, reducing the otherwise high false-positive rate of alerting on the log artifact alone.
Detects SSFileCopySender/SSFileCopyReceiver helpers running as uid=0 reading or writing sensitive system paths during Screen Sharing sessions using legacy VNC auth or lacking a preceding valid local logon — abuse of the root file-copy primitive underlying CVE-2026-65400.
Detects session hijacking activity characteristic of the Mirage2FA AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) phishing toolkit. The rule identifies non-interactive authentication events (token reuse) that lack an MFA challenge, occurring shortly after interaction with a known malicious phishing proxy domain. It further correlates this activity with anomalous signals, such as impossible travel or the use of an unseen device/user-agent, to confirm high-fidelity malicious intent.
Detects a privileged/elevated AI-agent tool invocation whose arguments are sourced from sandbox runtime output within 30 seconds of a PBKDF2/AES decrypt event, with no provenance tag distinguishing that output from trusted state — the generic post-decryption privileged-action sequence behind Cryptographic Context Injection attacks.
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