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Ethan Andrews

@eandrews
Trusted contributorCompletionist
13 followers324 downloads7,488 copies113 likes78,864 views

1,181 detections

Detects a malicious teardown sequence involving the 'drvsvc' service being stopped or deleted in the registry, followed by the deletion of the 'C:\Windows\System32\drivers\drv.sys' file within a 15-minute window. This behavior is indicative of a driver redeployment process, often associated with the removal of security-disabling components.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
3 months ago
002
Detects GitHub issue/PR comments attributed to the adk-bot service account that contain privileged workflow-trigger strings ('@gemini-cli' or '/adk-issue-fix'). The CI authorization gate validates only the commenter's account identity, not whether the trusted bot account was manipulated via prompt injection into posting the trigger itself, so any adk-bot comment containing these strings is a candidate forged bridge into maintainer-only automation.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
3 months ago
002
Detects the AutoIT payload injector multi-stage execution chain (wscript.exe -> powershell.exe -> cmd.exe -> powershell.exe -> autoit3.exe -> charmap.exe) used to deliver VIPKeylogger and MedusaHVNC, culminating in process injection into the legitimate charmap.exe utility.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
0011
Detects post-exploitation persistence and anti-forensic activity associated with the RufRoot/CVE-2026-59726 vulnerability. The rule identifies the creation of unauthorized .js files within application directories, the modification of 'index.js' followed by a SIGKILL to process ID 1 to force a container restart, and attempts to clear bash command history to hide malicious footprints.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
3010
Detects local processes invoking the splice() syscall with the MSG_SPLICE_PAGES flag to map file descriptors of readable SUID-root binaries directly into network socket buffers. This is the core technique behind CVE-2026-31635 (DirtyDecrypt), which corrupts the page cache of SUID-root binaries by placing their pages into attacker-controlled network packets before authentication completes.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
1010
Detects anomalous shell processes spawned as children of Git operations ('git apply' with index flags or specific plumbing commands) typical of the Gitea repository RCE vulnerability (CVE-2026-60004). This rule identifies malicious Git hooks triggered by the Gitea service account to execute arbitrary commands.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
2010
Detects an unprivileged local user invoking keyctl to add a key of type rxrpc_s to a keyring they control, enabling userspace reproduction of the kernel's RxGK token encryption key derivation as part of CVE-2026-31635 (DirtyDecrypt) exploitation.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
209
Detects unauthorized file system access to sensitive Gitea configuration files (app.ini) or internal directories (custom/conf, data/tmp) by the gitea/git service account. This pattern is indicative of post-exploitation credential or secret harvesting following remote code execution vulnerabilities, such as the diffpatch git hook RCE (CVE-2026-60004).
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
209
This rule detects the creation of executable files within Git hooks directories ('.git/hooks') initiated by 'git' or 'gitea' processes. The logic specifically excludes files ending in '.sample' to focus on active hook deployment. This behavior is indicative of the 'diffpatch' collision technique (CVE-2026-60004), where attackers attempt to plant malicious Git hooks to achieve remote code execution (RCE) in the context of the Gitea service account.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
309
Detects creation of a new com.<random-string>.plist file under ~/Library/LaunchAgents or /Library/LaunchAgents, followed by launchctl load/bootstrap referencing LaunchAgents, or an osascript-to-bash heredoc chain writing a plist into LaunchAgents, consistent with EtherHiding's macOS Launch Agent persistence mechanism.
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Ethan Andrews@eandrews
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Federal Signal Detections
4 months ago
5039
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