Ethan Andrews
@eandrewsTrusted contributorCompletionist
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1,181 detections
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Detects instances where the Claude Code AI agent process spawns shell interpreters (bash, sh) or network utilities (curl, wget, dig, nslookup) with potentially malicious command line arguments. This behavior can be indicative of indirect prompt injection or unauthorized remote code execution attempts, such as reverse shells, base64 encoded payloads, or DNS-based exfiltration.
Detects unauthorized attempts to access or extract Redis credentials from the Argo CD repo-server process. The detection identifies suspicious command-line activity where environment variables are enumerated (via env or printenv) or sensitive configuration files (/etc/argocd) are accessed by the repo-server process or its children. This behavior is indicative of an attacker attempting to exploit unauthenticated gRPC vulnerabilities to steal credentials for cache poisoning or further lateral movement within a containerized environment.
Detects the execution of 'kustomize' with the '--helm-command' flag configured to use a non-standard binary or script. When triggered within the context of an Argo CD repo-server, this behavior indicates a potential exploitation attempt of CVE-2024-31989, which allows for arbitrary command execution under the repo-server process context by coercing Kustomize to execute malicious files.
Detects the loading of a potentially vulnerable or unauthorized third-party kernel driver from outside the standard system driver directory, followed shortly (within 30 minutes) by the termination of security product processes or services. This behavioral pattern is indicative of 'Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver' (BYOVD) exploitation, often used to impair security tools and blind EDR/antivirus solutions.
Detects the use of PowerShell to forcefully terminate 'wscript.exe' using 'Stop-Process' or 'taskkill'. This behavior is associated with adversaries, such as those in the VEIL#DROP campaign, attempting to minimize forensic evidence after executing malicious JavaScript lures via Windows Script Host.
Detects a malicious HTA lure disguised as a military pay calculator. The attack involves a JScript routine that renames an embedded data file ('styles.dat') to an executable ('styles.dat.exe') and triggers its execution, characteristic of a spearphishing attachment delivering malware.
Detects the installation of an attacker-controlled root certificate into the Windows certificate store using certutil.exe. This activity is correlated with the modification of Firefox browser settings to trust the Windows OS certificate store, an action often performed to facilitate TLS interception and traffic stripping.
Detects browser navigation to sensitive Google account pages (e.g., myaccount.google.com/contactemail) occurring within 10 seconds of a browser extension installation. This pattern is consistent with automated redirects used to trigger Cross-Site Scripting (XS-Leak) vulnerabilities, potentially allowing attackers to exfiltrate sensitive user data or information via malicious extensions before the user can intervene.
Detects attempts to disable Windows Defender real-time protection, behavior monitoring, or scan capabilities. This is achieved by monitoring for specific HKLM registry modifications under 'SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows Defender' or the execution of PowerShell cmdlets 'Set-MpPreference' and 'Add-MpPreference' with arguments designed to disable security features or add file/process exclusions, often observed during initial stages of ransomware attacks.
Detects the persistence and execution mechanism of ChocoPoC RAT, where a Python interpreter is spawned in a hidden window using the CREATE_NO_WINDOW flag (0x08000000). The rule monitors command-line arguments and parent-child process relationships for indicators of the RAT's module import, specific environment variables used for anti-recursion loops, and process spawns originating from existing Python instances.
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