
Jacob Young
@jacobyoungsecCompletionist
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Detects the execution of `cmd.exe` with the `/c` argument to open a PDF file, originating from specific `AppData` subdirectories. This behavior is consistent with the SharkLoader dropper, often associated with the StrikeShark campaign, which uses decoy PDF documents to initiate its infection chain.
This rule detects the creation and execution of scheduled tasks used by StrikeShark's SharkLoader, often associated with Cobalt Strike, for persistence. It identifies suspicious scheduled task names that mimic legitimate Microsoft services (e.g., OneDrive, MicrosoftUpdate) and the execution of 'SystemSettings.exe' from unusual 'AppData' subdirectories ('xwreg' or 'xgdf'). The rule has three branches: detecting 'schtasks.exe' command-line usage to create such tasks, detecting 'ScheduledTaskCreated' events with the suspicious names or command patterns, and detecting 'SystemSettings.exe' execution from the specific 'AppData' subdirectories.
Detects process parent ID (PPID) spoofing where a process spawned by SystemSettings.exe claims a parent that is not SystemSettings.exe, svchost.exe, services.exe, or explorer.exe. This behavior is indicative of SharkLoader attempting to disguise Cobalt Strike Beacon process lineage using UpdateProcThreadAttribute/PROC_THREAD_ATTRIBUTE_PARENT_PROCESS. The rule also looks for suspicious process paths associated with SharkLoader.
Detects SystemSettings.exe executing from any directory other than its legitimate location (C:\Windows\ImmersiveControlPanel\). This behavior is indicative of DLL side-loading, often used by malware like SharkLoader to execute malicious SystemSettings.dll.
Detects when 'SystemSettings.exe' is copied from its legitimate location to common staging directories like ProgramData, AppData, Temp, or Public. This activity is often observed in campaigns like StrikeShark as an early indicator before sideloading, providing an opportunity for earlier detection.
This rule detects suspicious modifications or creations of Linux login log files (wtmp, btmp, utmp, lastlog, utmpx, wtmpx) by processes that are not legitimate system processes typically associated with managing these logs. Adversaries may modify or clear these logs to hide their presence on a system or to manipulate login records.
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