SigmaHQ Detections
@sigmaHQ12 followers122,473 downloads2,593 copies16 likes160,504 views
6,800 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
6,800
Categories
2,695
910
506
407
372
Platforms
5,315
505
263
204
164
Products / Services
2,051
1,570
475
423
316
MITRE Techniques
2,652
1,739
1,656
1,503
764
CVEs
19
19
19
16
10
Data Compressed
Sigma
An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network.
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems.
Detects the execution of host or user discovery utilities such as "whoami", "hostname", "id", etc.
Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Adversaries may use the information from System Owner/User Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions.
Detects the potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges
to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes,
or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Though intended for recovery and debugging, SysRq can be
misused as a stealthy post-exploitation tool. It is controlled via /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq or permanently through /etc/sysctl.conf.
to silently manipulate or destabilize a system. By writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger, they can crash the system, kill processes,
or disrupt forensic analysis—all while bypassing standard logging. Though intended for recovery and debugging, SysRq can be
misused as a stealthy post-exploitation tool. It is controlled via /proc/sys/kernel/sysrq or permanently through /etc/sysctl.conf.
Detects program executions in suspicious non-program folders related to malware or hacking activity
Detects usage of the `mknod` syscall to create special files (e.g., character or block devices).
Attackers or malware might use `mknod` to create fake devices, interact with kernel interfaces,
or establish covert channels in Linux systems.
Monitoring the use of `mknod` is important because this syscall is rarely used by legitimate applications,
and it can be abused to bypass file system restrictions or create backdoors.
Attackers or malware might use `mknod` to create fake devices, interact with kernel interfaces,
or establish covert channels in Linux systems.
Monitoring the use of `mknod` is important because this syscall is rarely used by legitimate applications,
and it can be abused to bypass file system restrictions or create backdoors.
Detects the creation of known offensive powershell scripts used for exploitation
Detect when System Manager successfully executes commands against an instance.
Detects execution of different log query utilities and commands to search and dump the content of specific event logs or look for specific event IDs.
This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
This technique is used by threat actors in order to extract sensitive information from events logs such as usernames, IP addresses, hostnames, etc.
A General detection for files being created in the Windows startup directory. This could be an indicator of persistence.
Page 159 of 680