SigmaHQ Detections
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Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the client process or its parent process has a Process ID (PID) of 0. A PID of 0 typically indicates the System Idle Process, which should not be initiating service installations. This behavior can be indicative of highly privileged malware or rootkits attempting to establish persistence or escalate privileges by creating services in an unusual context.
Detects Code Integrity (CI) engine blocking Microsoft Defender's processes (MpCmdRun and NisSrv) from loading unsigned DLLs. This activity may indicate an attempt to sideload arbitrary DLLs into legitimate Microsoft Defender processes, potentially for privilege escalation, persistence, or defense evasion.
Detects potential data exfiltration activity associated with the 'Shai-Hulud' NPM package attack. This rule specifically looks for the execution of 'curl' with command-line arguments indicating data being sent ('-d') to a known malicious webhook.site URL.
This rule detects activity associated with the OilRig APT group, as detailed in Nyotron's March 2018 report. Specifically, it looks for the creation of a scheduled task named 'SC Scheduled Scan' that executes 'autoit3.exe' from a specific path, execution of executables within a '
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Windows\Temp\DB\' directory, execution of 'C:\Windows\system32\Service.exe' with specific command-line arguments, and 'autoit3.exe' spawning 'nslookup.exe' with DNS TXT query parameters. These indicators collectively point to persistence mechanisms, execution of malicious payloads, and DNS-based command and control used by OilRig.
Detects the creation of specific files associated with the Pingback backdoor, which is known to establish an ICMP tunnel for command and control (C2) communications. The rule specifically looks for 'updata.exe' being created and 'C:\Windows\oci.dll' as the target filename, as described in the Trustwave report.
Detects post-exploitation execution technique of the Serpent backdoor. This involves creating a temporary scheduled task using an unusual method: creating a fictitious Windows event and a trigger that executes a payload once the event is created. The detection specifically looks for command-line arguments indicative of this behavior when executed by cmd.exe or powershell.exe.
Detects remote thread creation in command shell applications, such as "Cmd.EXE" and "PowerShell.EXE". This is a common technique used by malware, such as IcedID, to inject malicious code and execute it within legitimate processes.
This rule detects remote procedure call (RPC) activity related to the creation or execution of scheduled tasks using the SASec interface. Specifically, it looks for Event ID 3 from the RPC Firewall log source, where the InterfaceUuid matches '378e52b0-c0a9-11cf-822d-00aa0051e40f' (which corresponds to the Task Scheduler service) and the OpNum is either 0 (SchRpcRegisterTask) or 1 (SchRpcRunTask). This indicates an attempt to remotely register or run a scheduled task, which can be a method for lateral movement, execution, or persistence by adversaries.
Detects when an AWS Route 53 domain is transferred to another AWS account. This activity could indicate an attempt by an adversary to maintain persistence or exfiltrate domain control by moving it to an account they control.
This rule identifies suspicious activity related to Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) in AWS. Specifically, it looks for two events: `AssumeRoleWithSAML` from the `sts.amazonaws.com` service and `UpdateSAMLProvider` from the `iam.amazonaws.com` service. An adversary could leverage these actions to gain unauthorized access, establish persistence, or escalate privileges within an AWS environment by manipulating SAML providers or assuming roles via SAML.
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