SigmaHQ Detections
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Detects specific Windows registry modifications made by BlackByte ransomware variants. BlackByte sets three different registry values to escalate privileges and begin setting the stage for lateral movement and encryption. This rule triggers when any of the specified registry keys are set to DWORD 1.
Detects the execution of 'more.com' as a parent process and 'vbc.exe' as a child process. This specific process tree behavior has been observed in samples related to the Lummac Stealer, where the Lummac payload is injected into the 'vbc.exe' process.
Detects suspicious child processes created by CrushFTP, which could indicate the exploitation of a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability like CVE-2025-54309. The rule specifically looks for PowerShell, cmd, bitsadmin, certutil, mshta, cscript, or wscript processes spawned by CrushFTP, often with command-line arguments indicative of malicious activity (e.g., IEX, encoded commands for PowerShell, or common system commands for cmd).
Detects when a transfer lock was removed from an AWS Route 53 domain. This action is typically performed when intending to transfer the domain to a different registrar, but it can also be an indicator of malicious activity if unauthorized. Disabling the transfer lock makes the domain vulnerable to unauthorized transfers, which could lead to domain hijacking or redirection of traffic.
This rule monitors and alerts when a user is added to the 'Global Administrator' or 'Device Administrator' roles within Azure Active Directory. These roles grant highly elevated privileges, making this activity critical for detecting potential persistence, privilege escalation, or initial access attempts by adversaries. The detection logic specifically looks for 'Add member to role' operations within the RoleManagement category, targeting the unique identifiers for these two sensitive administrative roles.
Detects when a configuration change is made to an application's AppID URI in Azure Active Directory (now Microsoft Entra ID). This change can be indicative of an adversary attempting to modify an application's identity to facilitate malicious activities such as phishing, unauthorized access, or maintaining persistence.
Detects when a user is removed from a privileged role in Azure AD. Bulk changes should be investigated as they could indicate an adversary attempting to remove legitimate administrators or clean up their tracks after gaining access.
Detects when a user successfully resets their own password within Azure Active Directory. This rule specifically looks for 'UserManagement' category events with a 'Success' status, initiated by a 'UPN' (User Principal Name) and targeting a 'UPN' with an 'ActivityType' containing 'Password reset'.
Identifies when an account in a privileged role has not signed in for a specified number of days, indicating a potentially stale or unused privileged account. Such accounts can be a security risk if compromised, as they might not be actively monitored.
This rule detects sign-in attempts to Azure AD where the authentication requirement was single-factor, the sign-in was successful (ResultType: 0), the network location details were empty (indicating an unknown or unclassified location), and the device ID was also empty (indicating an unknown or unregistered device). This combination suggests a sign-in from an unknown device and potentially an untrusted location, which could be indicative of an adversary attempting to gain initial access or maintain persistence.
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