SigmaHQ Detections
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Detects registry changes to Microsoft Office "AccessVBOM" to a value of "1" which disables trust access for VBA on the victim machine and lets attackers execute malicious macros without any Microsoft Office warnings.
Detects when the Microsoft Outlook security setting for macro execution is modified to allow macros to run without warning. This change can enable malicious macros to execute automatically, potentially leading to persistence, privilege escalation, or further compromise.
This rule detects potential persistence mechanisms leveraging the Appx DebugPath feature in Windows. Adversaries can modify specific registry keys related to Universal Windows Platform (UWP) applications to inject a malicious DebugPath, which then executes their code when the associated application is launched. The rule specifically looks for modifications to the 'DebugPath' value within 'Classes\ActivatableClasses\Package\Microsoft.' registry paths or the default value within '\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\PackagedAppXDebug\Microsoft.' paths.
This rule detects modifications to Internet Explorer registry settings, which attackers can abuse for persistence or defense evasion. Specifically, it looks for changes within the 'Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings' registry path. Potential malicious activities include adding domains to the Trusted Sites Zone or injecting JavaScript for persistence. The rule filters out common benign modifications related to DWORD values, Office applications, cache, ZoneMap, WpadDecision paths, binary data, and changes made by 'RuntimeBroker.exe' or within 'Accepted Documents' to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation or modification of registry run keys to include PowerShell commands or scripts. This technique is commonly used for persistence and privilege escalation, allowing malicious code to execute automatically when a user logs in. The rule specifically looks for common PowerShell keywords and command-line arguments often associated with malicious activity, such as hidden windows, encoded commands, execution policy bypass, and various Invoke- commands for web requests or expression evaluation.
This rule detects attempts to disable Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) logging specifically for the Service Control Manager (SCM) by modifying the 'TracingDisabled' registry key. Adversaries may do this to impair defensive capabilities and hide their activities, as ETW logs are crucial for security monitoring and incident response.
This rule detects the creation or modification of Windows Registry 'Run' keys that point to executable files located in suspicious directories. Adversaries often use 'Run' keys for persistence, ensuring their malicious code executes automatically when a user logs in. By monitoring these keys for entries pointing to common temporary, user-specific, or system-related folders that are not typically used for legitimate application startup, the rule aims to identify potential malicious persistence mechanisms. The rule includes filters for known legitimate activities, such as Windows Update and Spotify, to reduce false positives.
Detects the modification of the Windows Registry to configure a driver or service to persist and load even when the system is booted into Safe Mode (Minimal or Network). This technique can be used by adversaries to maintain access and execute malicious code in a restricted environment, potentially bypassing security controls that are not active in Safe Mode.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of 'roboform.dll' or 'roboform-x64.dll' when loaded by an executable that is not the legitimate RoboForm application (robotaskbaricon.exe or robotaskbaricon-x64.exe) or is loaded from an unexpected path outside of the standard RoboForm installation directories. This technique can be used for persistence, defense evasion, and privilege escalation.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of "ShellDispatch.dll" by monitoring image load events. The rule specifically looks for instances where 'ShellDispatch.dll' is loaded from locations other than typical legitimate temporary directories (like ':\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\' or ':\Windows\Temp\'), which could indicate malicious activity.
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