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SigmaHQ Detections

@sigmaHQ
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6,800 detections

Detects when a shell program such as the Windows command prompt or PowerShell is launched with system privileges from an uncommon parent location. This behavior can indicate privilege escalation or defense evasion by an attacker.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0014
Detects the use of Windows API (WinAPI) functions being called directly via the command line. This technique is often used by threat actors, for example, with tools like winapiexec, to perform various malicious actions such as privilege escalation, process injection, or credential dumping by directly interacting with low-level operating system functions. The rule specifically looks for a wide range of sensitive WinAPI function names and DLLs in the command line arguments of newly created processes.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0014
Detects the execution of 'whoami.exe' when its parent process is not a common legitimate shell or application, or when the parent process information is missing. This can indicate suspicious activity, as 'whoami.exe' is often used by attackers for discovery purposes.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0014
Detects the use of the 'Get-ADComputer' cmdlet with specific parameters or LDAP filters to identify systems configured for unconstrained delegation. This activity is often performed by adversaries during the reconnaissance phase to find targets for Kerberos-based attacks like credential theft.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0014
Detects when the Console Window Host (conhost.exe) process is spawned by an uncommon parent process, which could be indicative of potential code injection activity. The rule specifically looks for conhost.exe being spawned by processes other than a predefined list of common and legitimate parents, while also filtering out specific command-line patterns for svchost.exe and Dropbox to reduce false positives.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0013
Adversaries may acquire credentials from web browsers by reading files specific to the target browser.
Web browsers commonly save credentials such as website usernames and passwords so that they do not need to be entered manually in the future.
Web browsers typically store the credentials in an encrypted format within a credential store.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects exploitation of LNK file command-line length discrepancy, where attackers hide malicious commands beyond the 260-character UI limit while the actual command-line argument field supports 4096 characters using whitespace padding (e.g., 0x20, 0x09-0x0D).
Adversaries insert non-printable whitespace characters (e.g., Line Feed \x0A, Carriage Return \x0D) to pad the visible section of the LNK file, pushing malicious commands past the UI-visible boundary.
The hidden payload, executed at runtime but invisible in Windows Explorer properties, enables stealthy execution and evasion—commonly used for social engineering attacks.
This rule flags suspicious use of such padding observed in real-world attacks.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects deletion attempts of MacOS Time Machine backups via the native backup utility "tmutil".
An adversary may perform this action before launching a ransonware attack to prevent the victim from restoring their files.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects the addition of a new file or path exclusion to MacOS Time Machine via the "tmutil" utility.
An adversary could exclude a path from Time Machine backups to prevent certain files from being backed up.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects potentially suspicious execution of the Qemu utility in a Windows environment.
Threat actors have leveraged this utility and this technique for achieving network access as reported by Kaspersky.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
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