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SigmaHQ Detections

@sigmaHQ
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6,800 detections

Detects changes to the "MaxMpxCt" registry value, which specifies the maximum outstanding network requests for the server per client when negotiating an SMB connection. Ransomware threat actors, specifically BlackCat, have been observed increasing this value to handle a higher volume of traffic, potentially for data exfiltration or other high-volume network activities.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0016
This rule detects indicators of potential exploitation of CVE-2023-27997, a critical Fortigate SSL VPN vulnerability. It specifically looks for GET or POST requests to '/remote/hostcheck_validate' or '/remote/logincheck' URIs that also contain the 'enc=' parameter in the query string. These patterns are associated with attempts to exploit the vulnerability.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0054
Detects changes to the "ServiceDLL" value related to a service in the registry. This is often used as a method of persistence by adversaries to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence or privilege escalation. The rule specifically looks for modifications to the ServiceDll registry key within the Windows Services hive, while filtering out common legitimate modifications related to printing, domain controllers, and system updates.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0015
Detects exploitation attempts of the OWASSRF variant targeting Exchange servers. This variant uses the OWA endpoint to access the PowerShell backend endpoint, indicated by specific URI patterns and HTTP methods. The rule filters out common legitimate user agents to reduce false positives.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
2044
This rule detects attempts to change the 'Altitude' registry value for the Sysmon driver instance. Modifying this value can prevent Sysmon from loading correctly at boot if the new altitude conflicts with other registered services, effectively disabling or impairing its monitoring capabilities. This technique is often used by adversaries to evade detection.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0013
Detects when an attacker registers a new IFilter for an extension. Microsoft Windows Search uses filters to extract the content of items for inclusion in a full-text index. Attackers can extend Windows Search to index new or proprietary file types by writing filters to extract the content, and property handlers to extract the properties of files, which can be abused for persistence. The rule specifically looks for modifications to registry keys related to PersistentHandler and CLSID, while filtering out known legitimate system paths and default IFilter CLSIDs to reduce false positives.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0013
Detects the creation of files with suspicious extensions (e.g., .bat, .dll, .exe, .hta, .js, .ps1, .vbe, .vbs) within the Windows Public user folder. This activity can indicate an adversary staging malicious scripts or binaries in a location accessible to all users, potentially for execution or further distribution.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0041
Detects the creation or update of a scheduled task to run with "NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM" privileges
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
000
Detects the execution of `cmd.exe` with output redirection (`>`) to suspicious locations such as temporary directories, user profile directories, or `ProgramData`. This technique is often used by adversaries to save the output of reconnaissance commands (e.g., `hostname`, `dir`) to files for later exfiltration, helping them evade immediate detection by storing command output in less scrutinized locations.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0012
Detects the execution of a renamed "NirCmd.exe" binary based on its original filename metadata. This rule specifically looks for instances where the 'OriginalFileName' field in the process creation event is 'NirCmd.exe', but the actual executed image path does not end with 'nircmd.exe' or 'nircmdc.exe'. This indicates an attempt to evade detection by renaming the legitimate NirCmd utility.
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SigmaHQ Detections@sigmaHQ
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SigmaHQ
2 years ago
0012
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