SigmaHQ Detections
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6,800 detections
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Detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique leveraging 'ieinstal.exe' as a parent process. The rule looks for processes with 'High' or 'System' integrity levels, where the parent process is 'ieinstal.exe' and the created process is 'consent.exe' located in a temporary directory ('\AppData\Local\Temp\'). This pattern is characteristic of the UACMe tool's method 64.
This rule detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that involves `pkgmgr.exe` launching `dism.exe` with elevated integrity levels. This behavior is characteristic of UACMe, a tool used to discover and implement UAC bypasses. The rule specifically looks for `dism.exe` being spawned as a child process of `pkgmgr.exe` and operating at 'High' or 'System' integrity levels, or their corresponding Security Identifier (SID) representations.
Detects image load events of system control panel items (.cpl) from uncommon or non-system locations which might be the result of sideloading. This technique can be used for defense evasion by masquerading malicious code as legitimate system components.
This rule detects suspicious child processes spawned by the Windows Print Spooler service (spoolsv.exe) running with System integrity. The detection logic specifically looks for the execution of various Windows utilities and command-line interpreters (like cmd.exe, powershell.exe, net.exe, wmic.exe, certutil.exe, bitsadmin.exe, rundll32.exe, etc.) that are commonly abused by attackers for execution, privilege escalation, or reconnaissance after exploiting vulnerabilities in the Print Spooler service (e.g., PrintNightmare). The rule includes filters to reduce false positives for some commands.
Detects a specific User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique that leverages the 'changepk.exe' and 'slui.exe' executables. This method is associated with UACMe bypass technique #61, where 'slui.exe' is used as a parent process to launch 'changepk.exe' with elevated privileges, bypassing the UAC prompt. The rule specifically looks for 'changepk.exe' being spawned by 'slui.exe' with an integrity level of 'High' or 'System'.
Detects User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts leveraging NTFS reparse points and wusa.exe DLL hijacking, specifically targeting techniques similar to UACMe method 36. This rule identifies the creation of processes with elevated integrity levels (High or System) executing 'wusa.exe' with a specific command line pattern pointing to a temporary update.msu file, or 'dism.exe' as a parent process launching 'DismHost.exe' with a suspicious command line containing temporary paths.
Detects a User Account Control (UAC) bypass technique leveraging Windows Media Player's `osk.exe` in conjunction with `cmd.exe` and `mmc.exe` to achieve elevated privileges. This specific pattern is associated with UACMe bypass method 32, which exploits the `osksupport.dll` vulnerability. The rule looks for the creation of `osk.exe` from the Windows Media Player directory, followed by `cmd.exe` being launched with a specific parent command line involving `mmc.exe` and `eventvwr.msc`, all while maintaining a high or system integrity level.
Detects the creation of a binary file with the ".sed" extension. The ".sed" extension stand for Self Extraction Directive files.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
These files are used by the "iexpress.exe" utility in order to create self extracting packages.
Attackers were seen abusing this utility and creating PE files with embedded ".sed" entries.
Usually ".sed" files are simple ini files and not PE binaries.
Detects suspicious usage of the ShellExec_RunDLL function to launch other commands, as observed in the Raspberry Robin attack. This rule specifically looks for 'ShellExec_RunDLL' in the command line combined with suspicious paths or commands like 'Desktop', 'Temp', 'Users\Public', 'comspec', 'iex', 'Invoke-', 'msiexec', 'odbcconf', or 'regsvr32'.
This rule detects the creation of a 'conhost.exe' process running with high integrity (elevated privileges) and using the '-ForceV1' and '0xffffffff' command-line options. This combination can be indicative of an attempt to bypass security controls or execute commands indirectly, as 'ForceV1' requests information directly from the kernel space and 'conhost' connects to the console application. This behavior has been observed in campaigns like Conti ransomware.
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