SigmaHQ Detections
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Detects patterns associated with DarkSide Ransomware and its helper processes. Specifically, it looks for command-line arguments used by DarkSide, such as '=[char][byte]('0x'+' or ' -work worker0 -path ', or the execution of an image from the 'AppData\Local\Temp\' directory when the parent process is 'DllHost.exe /Processid:{3E5FC7F9-9A51-4367-9063-A120244FBEC7}'.
This rule detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication associated with the Goofy Guineapig backdoor. It specifically looks for HTTP/S requests originating from a user agent string characteristic of the malware ('Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.71 Safari/537.36') communicating with the domain 'static.tcplog.com'. This combination of user agent and destination domain is indicative of Goofy Guineapig C2 activity.
Detects attempts to exploit the VMware Workspace ONE Access Authentication Bypass vulnerability (CVE-2022-31656). This vulnerability allows a malicious actor with network access to the UI to obtain administrative access without authentication by sending a specially crafted URI query.
Detects attempts to exploit an Apache Spark server via CVE-2022-33891, which is a shell command injection vulnerability, by looking for specific patterns in web server query strings.
Detects the creation of a "Report.wer" file in an uncommon folder structure, specifically outside of the typical Windows Error Reporting (WER) archive paths. This activity could indicate potential exploitation of CVE-2023-36874, where adversaries might manipulate WER to achieve execution or persistence.
Detects a suspicious DLL load by an "svchost" process based on location and name that might be related to ColdSteel RAT. This DLL location and name has been seen used by ColdSteel as the service DLL for its persistence mechanism.
Detects the creation of new Windows services with specific names ('Name', 'msupdate', 'msupdate2') and an ImagePath containing '\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'. This pattern is associated with the COLDSTEEL RAT for persistence.
This rule detects the execution of 'rundll32.exe' with specific command-line arguments and parent processes that are characteristic of Qakbot malware activity. It looks for 'rundll32.exe' being launched by common scripting or command-line interpreters (cmd.exe, cscript.exe, curl.exe, mshta.exe, powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, wscript.exe) and attempting to load DLLs from suspicious paths (ProgramData, Users\Public, AppData\Local\Temp, AppData\Roaming). Additionally, it specifically targets known export functions used by Qakbot, such as 'aslr', 'bind', 'DrawThemeIcon', 'GG10', 'GL70', 'jhbvygftr', 'kjhbhkjvydrt', 'LS88', 'Motd', 'N115', 'next', 'Nikn', 'print', 'qqqb', 'qqqq', 'RS32', 'Test', 'Time', 'Updt', 'vips', 'Wind', 'WW50', 'X555', 'XL55', 'xlAutoOpen', and 'XS88'. This combination of indicators aims to reduce false positives by focusing on behaviors uniquely associated with Qakbot.
Detects any registry event that targets the key 'SECURITY\Policy\Secrets\n', which is a known indicator of SNAKE malware activity as described by CISA. This specific registry key is used by SNAKE malware for covert storage.
Detects the creation of a registry value in the ".wav\OpenWithProgIds" key with an uncommon name. This activity is associated with the SNAKE malware, as reported by CISA, which uses this technique for persistence.
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