SigmaHQ Detections
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This rule detects the creation of a file named 'lsass.exe.dmp' within the 'C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\CrashDumps\' directory. This specific file pattern and location are indicative of an attempt to dump the LSASS process memory, which often contains sensitive credential material. Adversaries frequently use this technique to extract credentials for lateral movement or persistence. The rule specifically references the 'LSASS Shtinkering' technique, which abuses Windows Error Reporting to achieve LSASS memory dumping.
Detects the creation of suspicious binary files (DLL, EXE, SYS) within the `C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\color\` directory. This activity has been observed in attacks by threat actors, such as those described in the referenced Microsoft blog, where it's used for defense evasion or persistence by dropping malicious payloads in a trusted system directory.
Detects the creation of the LiveKD driver file (LiveKdD.SYS) by the LiveKD or LiveK64 executables. LiveKD is a tool used for live kernel debugging, which can be leveraged by adversaries for defense evasion or privilege escalation by interacting directly with the kernel.
Detects a potential privilege escalation attempt by monitoring the creation of specific ".Exe.Local" folders within the "System32" directory. This technique is used to sideload "comctl32.dll" into legitimate Windows processes, which can lead to privilege escalation or persistence.
Detects a threat actor creating a file named `wbemcomn.dll` in the `C:\Windows\System32\wbem\` directory over the network, which is a known technique for WMI DLL Hijacking. This specific scenario involves the `System` process, indicating a potential remote write operation followed by the system attempting to load the malicious DLL.
Detects `rundll32.exe` loading a renamed `comsvcs.dll` to dump process memory, which is a common technique for credential dumping, specifically targeting LSASS. The rule looks for `rundll32.exe` executions where the loaded image is NOT the legitimate `comsvcs.dll` (implying a renamed or malicious version).
Detects when the 'outlvba.dll' (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) is loaded by the 'outlook.exe' process. This activity can indicate the use of VBA macros within Outlook, which can be leveraged for persistence or execution by adversaries.
Detects programs that connect to known malware callback ports based on statistical analysis from two different sandbox system databases. This rule identifies outbound network connections to a specific list of destination ports that have been historically associated with malware command and control (C2) communications. It filters out connections to local IP ranges and common system directories to reduce false positives.
This rule detects outbound network connections to destination ports 8080 or 8888 that are not within common local IP ranges or initiated by programs in standard system directories. This aims to identify potentially malicious command and control (C2) activity or data exfiltration using non-standard ports.
This rule detects the creation of named pipes with specific naming conventions commonly used by Cobalt Strike. Cobalt Strike is a legitimate penetration testing tool that is frequently misused by threat actors for post-exploitation activities. The rule looks for pipe names containing "\MSSE-" and "-server", or starting with "\postex_", "\status_", "\msagent_", "\mojo_", "\interprocess_", "\samr_", "\netlogon_", "\srvsvc_", "\lsarpc_", or "\wkssvc_". These patterns are indicative of Cobalt Strike's beacon communication or other internal operations.
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