Arnold Chan
@slazTrusted contributorCompletionist
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7,399 detections
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This rule detects potential phishing activity by identifying bulk email campaigns (5 or more recipients) where either the email subject contains known suspicious keywords (e.g., 'password', 'urgent', 'invoice') or the Reply-To address domain differs from the sender domain. The rule specifically excludes emails with attachments or URLs, focusing on social engineering pretexts that aim to initiate a conversation or gather information without external payloads.
Detects anomalous OAuth redirection chains initiated from login.microsoftonline.com or accounts.google.com that target infrastructure identified as malicious .vu domains. This pattern is indicative of a consent-phishing campaign attempting to redirect users to malicious infrastructure.
This rule detects command and control (C2) communication patterns utilized by the GoCaracal malware family, specifically its fallback mechanism which leverages Ethereum blockchain RPC calls (eth_getStorageAt) to interact with known malicious smart contracts or wallet addresses.
Detects the creation of an NTUSER.MAN file followed by an update or creation of a registry run key (Run or RunOnce) on the same device within a 60-minute window. NTUSER.MAN is a mandatory user profile file that, when present, can be used to override user settings and persist malicious configurations or startup entries.
This rule monitors for the connection of specific KVM-over-IP hardware devices (e.g., PiKVM, Guermok) which can be used by an adversary to gain remote access to a system's physical keyboard, video, and mouse interface, effectively bypassing software-based security controls.
This rule detects the execution of a file named 'report.bin' and correlates it with subsequent network connections originating from the same process. This behavior is indicative of a potential C2 heartbeat or exfiltration activity involving a non-standard or obfuscated executable.
Detects the execution of 'driverquery.exe' to enumerate information about the 'npf.sys' driver (Network Packet Filter), which is associated with Npcap/WinPcap used for packet capture. The rule specifically monitors when this command is launched by non-standard parent processes like 'report.bin' or 'nw.exe', which may indicate malicious reconnaissance or network monitoring tools.
Detects the addition of suspicious file names or known potentially unwanted program artifacts to Windows Run registry keys, often used for persistence. The rule correlates registry modifications with potential installer process activity.
Detects periodic TLS network beacons to external destinations on port 443, characteristic of the BridgeAgent malware. The rule identifies suspicious outbound connections that exhibit consistent, repetitive behavior patterns, potentially indicating C2 communication. It is recommended to correlate this network activity with EDR alerts focusing on masquerading processes, specifically instances where binaries like gnome-shell are running as root and persisted via service mechanisms like zabbix_agent.service.
Detects network-based command signaling shared by the Fire Ant/REPTILE-derivative backdoor and its reverse-tunneling implant capability. Identifies the 'magic string' activation sequence and matching 'kill marker' termination sequence over TCP and UDP — indicative of packet-triggered backdoor activation, port-knocking style C2, or reverse-tunnel establishment via raw socket communication.
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