Tim Peck
@timpeckTrusted contributorCompletionist
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919 detections
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Detects behavioral characteristics of the Needle Rust desktop agent: an unsigned Rust PE in the 5-50MB range, executing from user-writable paths, and establishing the Run-key persistence the agent installs at HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. The Rust panic-handler source paths (src/views/zelcore/app.rs, src/views/trezor/seed_panel.rs, src/views/ledger/screens/seed_recovery.rs) are also surfaced via the binary's data section and are extremely high-fidelity if visible in any command-line or memory-scan telemetry. This rule pairs the persistence registration with the agent execution context.
Detects command-line obfuscation via Windows environment variable substring expansion (%var:~offset,length%), an evasion technique used by APT37 in the Operation Deepfake/HumanitarianBait-adjacent campaigns to reconstruct malicious commands at runtime and bypass static command-line scanning. This rule catches both the APT37-specific single-character extraction pattern (,1%) and the broader high-count substring-expansion pattern that any obfuscated command exhibits regardless of chunk size. It also flags cmd.exe /k invocation, which APT37 commonly uses.
Detects potential user namespace manipulation, a common precursor to kernel namespace exploits like Dirty Frag, by monitoring file modifications to uid_map and gid_map.
Detects PowerShell scripts attempting to overwrite the amsiContext buffer using Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal.WriteInt32 to disable AMSI scanning. This technique was notably observed in the InstallFix campaign delivering RedLine Stealer.
Detects the malformed User-Agent string used by CL-STA-1132 during exploitation
of CVE-2026-0300 (PAN-OS Captive Portal buffer overflow). The UA is structurally
invalid (Safari token precedes Mozilla token, Mozilla/5.5 is non-standard) and
has no known legitimate origin.
of CVE-2026-0300 (PAN-OS Captive Portal buffer overflow). The UA is structurally
invalid (Safari token precedes Mozilla token, Mozilla/5.5 is non-standard) and
has no known legitimate origin.
Detects pythonw.exe executing .pyw scripts from user-writable directories outside canonical Python installation paths. This execution pattern is used by Operation HumanitarianBait (module.pyw from %APPDATA%\WindowsHelper) and similar PyArmor-packed Python infostealer campaigns like PXA Stealer and JarkaStealer. These campaigns drop self-contained Python environments into vendor-mimicking AppData subdirectories. The rule catches the specific HumanitarianBait path/script combination and variants that alter the path or script name while maintaining the windowless-Python-from-AppData primitive.
Detects Node.js processes querying public IP-address and geolocation lookup services. This automated reconnaissance behavior is the standard "where am I" primitive used by an enormous range of Node-based malware and supply chain campaigns including PhantomRaven (npm), Shai-Hulud, the Bitwarden CLI compromise, Ultralytics-style attacks, and countless commodity Node-based stealers and droppers. Legitimate Node applications rarely query public IP services from developer endpoints — when they do, it is most often during malicious package install lifecycle hooks or within fileless droppers fetched from attacker-controlled C2 servers.
Detects the creation of a new MariaDB User-Defined Function (UDF) that loads a shared object (.so or .dll) file. This technique is used in the final stage of the CVE-2026-32710 attack chain to execute arbitrary OS commands, often from suspicious temporary or public directories.
Detects the initial staging phase of the CVE-2026-41940 exploit chain, where an attacker intentionally generates a pre-authentication session file on the target server via failed POST requests to the login_only endpoint.
Detects creation or modification of the SafeBoot\Network\Remote Access Service registry key, a persistence mechanism used by the STAC6405 (VENOMOUS#HELPER) campaign. This ensures the SimpleHelp-based RAT survives Safe Mode with Networking reboots, which is a common remediation step for defenders. The specific 'Remote Access Service' subkey under SafeBoot\Network is a static Indicator of Compromise (IOC) for this campaign, as modifications to SafeBoot\Network are generally rare in benign Windows operations.
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