Tim Peck
@timpeckTrusted contributorCompletionist
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919 detections
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Detects WinGUp (gup.exe) making network connections to domains other than the legitimate Notepad++ update infrastructure. Per Kevin Beaumont, gup.exe should only connect to notepad-plus-plus.org, github.com, and release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Detects the use of the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) utility to add an exclusion (Path, Process, or Extension) to Microsoft Defender. This technique is used by malware, such as the MKDOOR backdoor, to prevent detection by security products.
Detects the use of the 'Add-Type' cmdlet in PowerShell to compile and load C# code directly into memory. This technique is used by the TAMECAT backdoor to pivot from PowerShell to C# modules for tasks like exfiltration and browser data theft, bypassing file-on-disk scanning.
Detects the suspicious spawning of UserAccountBroker.exe by explorer.exe, which is then observed making an outbound network connection. This behavior is characteristic of a watchdog mechanism used by the ValleyRAT malware to maintain persistence and C2 communication.
Detects persistence mechanisms used by the OtterCookie malware, part of the Lazarus "Contagious Interview" campaign. It specifically looks for the creation of a 'NodeHelper' registry run key and a 'NodeUpdate' scheduled task.
Detects the multi-stage DEAD#VAX infection chain by correlating the creation of a specific batch file artifact with subsequent execution, persistence, or process injection activities.
Detects the execution of a process named 'code.exe' or 'lightshot.exe' from a temporary directory.
This behavior was observed in a campaign involving a malicious VS Code extension, "ClawdBot Agent", which impersonates a legitimate AI coding assistant.
The extension drops and executes a weaponized ScreenConnect payload, masquerading it as a legitimate VS Code or Lightshot process to evade detection.
The execution is often spawned by the legitimate VS Code process.
This behavior was observed in a campaign involving a malicious VS Code extension, "ClawdBot Agent", which impersonates a legitimate AI coding assistant.
The extension drops and executes a weaponized ScreenConnect payload, masquerading it as a legitimate VS Code or Lightshot process to evade detection.
The execution is often spawned by the legitimate VS Code process.
Detects the Quest Desktop Authority agent service spawning suspicious child processes. This activity could be an indication of exploitation of CVE-2025-67813, where an attacker leverages the 'AdminExec' operation to achieve remote code execution as SYSTEM.
Detects the use of the finger.exe utility to download remote data and pipe it directly into a command interpreter for execution. This LOLBin technique is used by threat actors like KongTuke to download and execute subsequent stages.
Detects Sysmon Image Load events for shdocvw.dll or ieframe.dll by Office applications, which indicates the Shell.Explorer.1 or Internet Explorer component is being loaded. This is a direct indicator of CVE-2026-21509 exploitation as Office normally doesn't load these browser-related DLLs. The vulnerability specifically exploits the Shell.Explorer.1 COM object which relies on these DLLs for browser functionality within Office documents.
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