Tim Peck
@timpeckTrusted contributorCompletionist
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919 detections
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Detects the use of known malicious or suspicious User-Agent strings associated with the UNC6395 data theft campaign targeting Salesforce instances.
Detects Inf0s3c Stealer, a Python-based malware that is typically packed with PyInstaller and then compressed with UPX. This rule identifies files containing artifacts from both packers, along with strings specific to the stealer.
Detects network requests to common IP geolocation services, such as 'ip-api.com/json'. This is a known anti-analysis technique used by malware, including a loader associated with the Silver Fox APT group, to determine if it is running in a research or sandbox environment by checking the public IP address, ISP, and organization.
Detects the execution of a suspicious PowerShell dropper script, often initiated by a user clicking a malicious file (e.g., LNK). This pattern is common in phishing campaigns, including those by groups like Kimsuky. The detection looks for PowerShell commands that use common evasion techniques (like hidden windows or bypassing execution policies).
Detects the execution of LOLBins (msiexec.exe, mshta.exe) with command-line arguments to download or execute remote files, a technique used in the ShadowCaptcha campaign's initial access phase via fake CAPTCHA pages.
Detects the malicious telemetry.js file used in the s1ngularity supply chain attack. This script harvests sensitive developer assets and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled GitHub repositories.
Detects outbound API calls to api.github.com for repository creation or file uploads matching patterns used in the s1ngularity supply chain attack.
Detects when a single Autonomous System Number (ASN) is associated with multiple organization names within a short time frame. This could indicate a rebranding or transfer of network blocks to evade sanctions or scrutiny, as seen with the Stark Industries threat activity enabler.
Detects PowerShell preparing to execute shellcode using the CallWindowProc API. This technique is used to bypass EDRs by executing code without creating a new thread, which is a commonly monitored API call.
Detects a Component Object Model (COM) TypeLib hijacking persistence technique. This rule identifies modifications to the registry for the 'Microsoft Web Browser' CLSID, where it is altered to point to a malicious scriptlet (.sct) file. This specific method was used by the MixShell malware in the ZipLine campaign to maintain access.
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