Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects instances where a user or administrator grants consent to an OAuth application in Azure AD requesting highly sensitive delegated or application permissions, such as Mail.Read, Mail.ReadWrite, offline_access, or directory-wide read/write scopes. Attackers often use these consents to maintain persistent, silent access to a user's mailbox and cloud resources even after primary session tokens are revoked.
Detects the mass creation of high-performance compute instances (GPU or high-memory variants) in an AWS environment. By filtering out legitimate service-linked roles associated with auto-scaling, the rule isolates potentially unauthorized manual provisioning, often indicative of cryptojacking or resource hijacking.
Detects potential persistence mechanisms in AWS by monitoring the creation of new IAM users or roles, the issuance of long-lived credentials (access keys or login profiles), or the creation of roles with permissive cross-account trust policies. This rule specifically excludes known legitimate automation roles to reduce noise.
Detects a suspicious sequence of events where a user performs a device-code authentication flow from a previously unseen application, followed within a two-hour window by sensitive account activities such as OAuth application consent/registration or mailbox-related administrative operations. This behavior is characteristic of passkey-phishing campaigns designed to steal access tokens and achieve persistence or data access via malicious OAuth applications.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege Entra ID directory roles (e.g., Global Administrator) to identities that either have a recent risky sign-in history or were created within the last 48 hours. This pattern is indicative of privilege escalation following account compromise or the creation of backdoored accounts by an attacker. Assignments including change management tracking tags are excluded to reduce noise.
This rule detects potentially malicious OAuth application consent grants where a user authorizes an application with high-privilege scopes (such as mail or directory access). The detection flags consent grants for applications that are either unverified by the publisher or newly created within the last 30 days, and correlates these events with suspicious sign-in activity (high/medium risk or failures) for the same user within a two-hour window.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege roles to cloud user accounts in Entra ID, AWS, or GCP when that assignment is preceded by anomalous sign-in behavior (high-risk or failed authentication) within 24 hours, or when the account appears to be dormant (no activity in 90+ days) prior to the privilege assignment.
This rule detects potential unauthorized account creation by correlating suspicious administrative activity on network edge devices (VPNs, firewalls) with subsequent local administrator account creation on an internal host within a one-hour window. This behavior is indicative of ransomware affiliates exploiting internet-facing infrastructure to gain initial access and escalate privileges.
This rule monitors for known suspicious RPC interface and function calls indicative of post-exploitation activities. It specifically targets RPC patterns used for lateral movement (e.g., PsExec, wmiexec, dcomexec), authentication coercion (e.g., PetitPotam, PrinterBug), and credential theft (e.g., DCSync, SAMR enumeration) by filtering on specific interface UUIDs and operation numbers.
Detects the request for DS-Replication-Get-Changes or DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All extended rights on domain objects, which are highly sensitive Active Directory permissions required to perform DCSync attacks to harvest credentials from Domain Controllers.
This rule detects potentially malicious inbox rule creation or modification in Office 365 Exchange. It flags rules that contain keywords associated with financial fraud (e.g., invoice, wire, payment) and include actions that hide evidence (e.g., moving messages to junk or deleting them). It further correlates these actions with suspicious user login activity, such as logging in from a new IP address or country within an hour of the rule change, which is a common indicator of a Business Email Compromise (BEC) account takeover.
This rule detects potential lateral movement via Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) by identifying a single user account establishing RemoteInteractive (logon type 10) sessions to three or more distinct destination hosts within a 15-minute timeframe. This pattern is indicative of an attacker attempting to traverse a network from a compromised host.
Detects instances where an IAM user creates a new access key or requests a session token, followed by subsequent API activity from a different source IP address or region within a one-hour window. This behavior is often associated with the creation of persistence mechanisms or credential theft.
Detects modifications to AWS IAM policies (user or role policies) that grant AdministratorAccess, PowerUserAccess, or wildcard permissions (*). This is a common indicator of privilege escalation or persistence, where an attacker grants themselves or another identity broad administrative access within the AWS account.
Detects potential Pass-the-Hash (PtH) activity by monitoring for NTLM network logons (Logon Type 3) that are associated with a blank WorkstationName, often indicating spoofing. This pattern is correlated with the assignment of special privileges (EventID 4672) to capture scenarios where stolen NTLM hashes are replayed for lateral movement into a system.
Detects a successful self-service password reset followed shortly by an authentication method change on the same account -- the exact SSPR-then-MFA-reregistration sequence used by Storm-3068 and Storm-2949 for persistence.
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
This rule detects potential lateral movement activity by identifying the execution of PsExec service components or common lateral movement tools (PsExec, WMIC, CMD) interacting with Windows administrative shares (via UNC paths or specific network ports 135, 139, 445). It specifically looks for process creation events associated with these tools and network activity indicative of remote administration. Legitimate administrative tools signed by Microsoft or known management software (SolarWinds, Tanium, Ivanti, IBM BigFix) are explicitly excluded.
Detects potential help-desk impersonation or social engineering activity involving account credential or MFA method resets, followed shortly by a sign-in from an unknown device or geography. The rule excludes activity tied to established ticketing systems or standard automated password expiration processes.
Detects potential help-desk impersonation or social engineering activity involving account credential or MFA method resets, followed shortly by a sign-in from an unknown device or geography. The rule excludes activity tied to established ticketing systems or standard automated password expiration processes.
This rule monitors Android device process events for the execution of 'adb' commands aimed at modifying sensitive system configurations. It specifically tracks attempts to enable accessibility services, toggle wireless debugging, or establish unauthorized ADB pairings. The rule identifies potential malicious intent by aggregating multiple suspicious configuration changes on the same device within a short time window.
Detects cloud service principals identified as AI agents or assistants performing sensitive API operations such as IAM policy modifications or storage configuration changes. This pattern may indicate that an AI service account has been compromised or misused to perform reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or persistence, exceeding its intended scope of operation.
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