Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects a single identity/IP querying Microsoft Graph endpoints for directory roles, role management, registered authentication methods, applications, service principals, OAuth2 permission grants, and app role assignments within a short window - control-plane reconnaissance mapping privilege escalation and persistence opportunities
Detects the rare 'AssumeRoot' event in AWS STS followed by high-impact administrative or destructive API calls within a one-hour window. This behavior often indicates an adversary attempting to gain elevated, privileged access to perform unauthorized actions such as disabling logging, deleting infrastructure, or modifying IAM policies.
Detects high-risk operations performed by the Entra ID/AAD Connect synchronization service account (e.g., Sync_* or ADToAADSyncServiceAccount). This account, which often holds broad directory permissions, is a prime target for attackers to gain persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud directory. The rule monitors for unauthorized sign-ins, sensitive configuration changes (such as modifications to federation trust, authentication policies, or directory synchronization settings), and password resets targeting the sync account itself.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging.
Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
Correlate with related EXECVE or PROCTITLE events to identify the process or user responsible for the access or modification.
Detects the creation or modification of system users and groups on NetScaler ADC/Gateway appliances by monitoring Syslog events (e.g., nsconmsg, audit logs). The rule specifically triggers when these actions occur outside of standard business hours or on weekends, indicating potential unauthorized account manipulation or unauthorized persistence mechanisms.
This rule detects potential privilege escalation in cloud environments (AWS, Azure, GCP) by identifying the attachment or update of overly permissive policies (e.g., wildcard permissions or administrative roles) followed by rapid execution of high-privilege actions (like creating new users, keys, or profiles) by the same actor within 15 minutes.
Detects instances where a user account registers or modifies MFA authentication methods (such as phone numbers or apps) for a different user account. This behavior is indicative of an attacker with administrative privileges attempting to establish persistence on a target account by adding their own MFA device.
Detects chained AWS STS AssumeRole/AssumeRoleWithSAML/AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity events where a principal assumes a role in a different account and then quickly performs another role assumption from that new context. This pattern, often referred to as 'role chaining' or 'role laundering', is frequently used to obfuscate identity tracking and facilitate lateral movement across AWS account boundaries.
This rule detects indicators of the PitScaler campaign targeting Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway appliances, exploiting vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-88771, CVE-2026-88772). It identifies the full attack chain including initial DTLS heap corruption exploitation, WHIPSHOT web shell C2 patterns, SLAPSHOT tunneling artifacts, web shell deployment files, httpd.conf PHP configuration tampering for persistence, privilege escalation via setuid /bin/sh modification, and anti-forensic log tampering.
The following analytic detects a user account (non-machine account) adding or removing a servicePrincipalName (SPN) on a computer object in Active Directory, via Windows Security Event 5136.
In normal AD operations, SPN values on computer objects are managed exclusively by the computer account itself (during domain join or name change), by Domain Controllers during replication, or by the SYSTEM/NETWORK SERVICE context — all of which appear as accounts ending in the dollar sign ($) convention.
A named user account writing to the servicePrincipalName attribute of a computer object is anomalous and may indicate an attacker with delegated WriteProperty rights over computer accounts performing SPN manipulation.
In normal AD operations, SPN values on computer objects are managed exclusively by the computer account itself (during domain join or name change), by Domain Controllers during replication, or by the SYSTEM/NETWORK SERVICE context — all of which appear as accounts ending in the dollar sign ($) convention.
A named user account writing to the servicePrincipalName attribute of a computer object is anomalous and may indicate an attacker with delegated WriteProperty rights over computer accounts performing SPN manipulation.
This analytic detects mailbox rule creation, a common technique used in Business Email Compromise. It uses a scoring mechanism to identify a combination of attributes often featured in mailbox rules created by attackers. This may indicate that an attacker has gained access to the account.
This detection identifies an Active Directory access-control list (ACL) modification event, which applies the minimum required extended rights to perform the DCShadow attack.
The following analytic detects the addition of permissions required for a DCSync attack, specifically DS-Replication-Get-Changes, DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All, and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set. It leverages EventCode 5136 from the Windows Security Event Log to identify when these permissions are granted. This activity is significant because it indicates potential preparation for a DCSync attack, which can be used to replicate AD objects and exfiltrate sensitive data. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could gain extensive access to Active Directory, leading to severe data breaches and privilege escalation.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication methods policy where a new external authentication method is configured using a non-approved discovery URL. This could indicate an adversary attempting to configure a malicious identity provider to facilitate authentication bypass or unauthorized access.
Detects instances where an identity associated with AI or automated agents (service accounts, service principals, bots, or assistants) is assigned to highly privileged administrative roles or security groups in the directory. This behavior potentially indicates an attempt to escalate privileges using a compromised or improperly configured agent identity.
Detects when a user has either been assigned or removed from an Admin/Privileged role. Providing the analyst with the relevant event information for further investigation.
Detects the creation or modification of a local NetScaler administrative account with superuser (nsroot-level) privileges via the appliance CLI or management API. This activity is indicative of persistent administrative backdoors potentially established after the exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-88771 or CVE-2026-88772.
This rule monitors NetScaler ADC/Gateway system logs for configuration modifications (save, add, or set commands) that occur outside of a designated maintenance window. Such activities, when performed off-hours, may indicate unauthorized persistence, defense evasion, or configuration tampering following successful exploitation.
This rule monitors for high-impact configuration API calls and the creation of new administrator accounts within the Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC). These actions are indicative of post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-20079, which allows for authentication bypass. The detection focuses on sensitive administrative actions such as policy deployment, certificate exports, and user account creation which, if performed without valid session context, suggest an unauthorized actor.
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