Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects changes to Entra ID Conditional Access policies that degrade security posture. This includes deleting a policy, disabling an enabled policy, removing grant controls (like MFA requirements), expanding trusted location/IP ranges, or adding user/group/role exclusions. Such activities are indicative of an attacker attempting to weaken authentication and security enforcement to maintain persistent access or facilitate further lateral movement.
The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
The following analytic identifies the assignment of sensitive and privileged Azure Active Directory roles to an Azure AD user. Adversaries and red teams alike may assign these roles to a compromised account to establish Persistence in an Azure AD environment. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
This detection monitors the addition of the following ACLs to an Active Directory group object: "Full control", "All extended rights", "All validated writes", "Create all child objects", "Delete all child objects", "Delete subtree", "Delete", "Modify permissions", "Modify owner", and "Write all properties". Such modifications can indicate potential privilege escalation or malicious activity. Immediate investigation is recommended upon alert.
The following analytic identifies when the SID of a privileged user is added to the SID History attribute of another user. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4742 and 4738, combined with identity lookups, to detect this activity. This behavior is significant as it may indicate an attempt to abuse SID history for unauthorized access across multiple domains. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to escalate privileges or maintain persistent access within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
Detects a sequence of suspicious activities including local account creation, modification of account security policies, and enabling of administrative services or credential exposure settings within a short time window. This typically indicates post-exploitation behavior where an adversary is attempting to establish persistence or facilitate further lateral movement.
Detects modifications to Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) authentication policies, specifically the registration, enablement, or modification of External Authentication Methods (EAMs). This activity can indicate an attempt to add a rogue authentication provider for persistent unauthorized access, bypassing standard MFA or conditional access policies.
Detects the physical connection of unauthorized IP-KVM devices (e.g., PiKVM) to corporate endpoints, which could be used for remote control via HDMI capture and USB HID emulation. This detection monitors Plug and Play (PnP) events for specific device descriptors and hardware identifiers commonly associated with remote access hardware.
This rule detects when a Service Principal or Application is assigned to highly privileged directory roles within Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). Adversaries may perform this action to achieve persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud environment by granting high-level administrative access to a compromised or adversary-controlled service principal.
Detects modifications to security groups, network security groups (NSG), or firewall rules across AWS, Azure, and GCP that expose sensitive management or database ports (22, 3389, 3306, 5432, 6379, 9200, 27017) to the entire internet (0.0.0.0/0). Such configurations significantly increase the attack surface and potential for unauthorized access, brute-force attacks, or data exposure.
Detects unauthorized modifications or deletions of cloud logging sinks in Google Cloud Platform (GCP) or diagnostic settings in Azure, which may indicate an attacker attempting to disable audit logs to cover their tracks or evade detection.
Detects instances where a long-dormant Entra ID (Azure AD) service principal is reactivated shortly after having a new credential added or a new app role assigned. This activity is a potential persistence technique where an attacker repurposes a legitimate, high-privileged, but unused service principal to blend in as legacy automation.
Detects the creation or modification of federated identity credentials within Azure Active Directory (Entra ID). This technique allows external services like GitHub Actions, Kubernetes, or other identity providers to authenticate as an application without stored secrets, bypassing traditional secret-rotation and credential-scanning security controls. The rule identifies potential unauthorized persistence by highlighting external or unrecognized issuers.
Detects a successful self-service password reset followed shortly by an authentication method change on the same account -- the exact SSPR-then-MFA-reregistration sequence used by Storm-3068 and Storm-2949 for persistence.
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
Hardened before submission: switched TargetResources[0] positional indexing to mv-expand + type == "User" matching, consistent with the fix already applied to the Agent User group-membership rule.
MITRE ATT&CK: T1098.005 (Account Manipulation: Device Registration), T1556 (Modify Authentication Process)
The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged Azure Active Directory roles to a user. It leverages Azure AD audit logs, specifically monitoring the "Add member to role" operation. This activity is significant as adversaries may assign privileged roles to compromised accounts to maintain persistence within the Azure AD environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to escalate privileges, access sensitive information, and maintain long-term control over the Azure AD infrastructure.
The following analytic detects potential privilege escalation threats in Azure Active Directory (AD). This detection is important because it identifies instances where privileged roles that hold elevated permissions are assigned to service principals. This prevents unauthorized access or malicious activities, which occur when these non-human entities access Azure resources to exploit them. False positives might occur since administrators can legitimately assign privileged roles to service principals. This detection leverages the O365 Universal Audit Log data source.
ACL deletion performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for information on the source device during triage.
ACL modification performed on the domain root object, significant AD change with high impact. Following MS guidance all changes at this level should be reviewed. Drill into the logonID within EventCode 4624 for information on the source device during triage.
This detection identifies when a a new client side extension is added to an Active Directory Group Policy using the Group Policy Management Console.
Detects unauthorized or suspicious modifications to audit and logging configurations across AWS, Azure, and GCP. The rule identifies actions such as stopping, deleting, or updating logging trails, diagnostic settings, or logging sinks, which may indicate an adversary attempting to impair visibility into their activities (Anti-Forensics).
Detects modifications to Azure AD/Entra ID security configurations that lower the security posture, specifically the disabling of Security Defaults, per-user MFA requirements, or strong authentication enforcement. This is often a precursor to account takeover or persistence following unauthorized administrative access.
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