Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of Kubernetes RoleBindings or ClusterRoleBindings that grant highly privileged roles (e.g., cluster-admin or wildcard permissions) to a subject. The detection includes behavioral analysis to identify ServiceAccount usage from unusual source IP addresses within a short timeframe, which may indicate account compromise and unauthorized privilege escalation.
Detects instances where a user grants an OAuth application sensitive, high-privilege permissions (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All) that are commonly abused in consent phishing campaigns to maintain persistent, silent access to mail and files independent of user credentials.
Detects the creation or modification of Exchange mailbox rules using the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule cmdlets that perform automatic forwarding or redirection of email to external, non-trusted domains. This technique is commonly employed during account takeover events to facilitate covert data exfiltration.
Correlates an Entra ID MFA/authenticator reset with a new device registration within 30 minutes for the same account. Models the Scattered Spider (UNC3944/Octo Tempest) and CrowdStrike-tracked 'Mutant Spider' helpdesk-vishing playbook, where Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 measured ~40 minutes from vished reset to domain admin.
Detects network or system activity associated with the 'p2pwn' backdoor account on Dahua cameras, which is introduced by exploiting the CVE-2024-39943 vulnerability. The rule monitors for the presence of 'p2pwn' and 'p2password' strings across logs, including RPC/login events.
Detects potential help-desk impersonation or social engineering activity involving account credential or MFA method resets, followed shortly by a sign-in from an unknown device or geography. The rule excludes activity tied to established ticketing systems or standard automated password expiration processes.
Detects instances where an administrative, helpdesk, or support account registers or updates security info (such as MFA methods) for a user, specifically when this action is preceded by a password reset for that same user. This pattern is indicative of account takeover attempts, particularly those involving vishing-based social engineering of helpdesk staff to bypass MFA.
Detects a burst of file access or download operations from SharePoint or OneDrive by a single user account within a short timeframe. This behavior is indicative of bulk data collection or exfiltration, often associated with post-credential-theft activity where an attacker stage and extract organizational data.
This rule monitors for the addition of new credentials (secrets) to service principals or applications in an Azure/Entra ID environment. It then correlates this event with subsequent mailbox activity (such as accessing mail items, sending mail, or message binding) performed by the application within 7 days of the credential creation. This detection pattern is indicative of potential OAuth application-based persistence and mailbox data exfiltration.
Detects high-risk AWS API calls indicative of privilege escalation within IAM (e.g., policy attachments, credential creation) or activities aimed at tampering with or disabling CloudTrail logging, which is often a precursor to or indication of unauthorized activity to evade detection.
Detects the creation of new administrator accounts or super_admin profiles on network devices such as firewalls from Fortinet, Cisco, Meraki, WatchGuard, and Sophos. This rule monitors log messages indicating administrative account provisioning, which is a potential indicator of unauthorized account manipulation or persistence attempts.
Detects bulk or frequent modifications to firewall policies across various network vendor devices, including Fortinet, Cisco Meraki, WatchGuard, and Sophos. The rule identifies high volumes of policy changes within a 15-minute window or logs summary counts to highlight potentially unauthorized administrative activity.
Detects high-risk operations performed by the Entra ID/AAD Connect synchronization service account (e.g., Sync_* or ADToAADSyncServiceAccount). This account, which often holds broad directory permissions, is a prime target for attackers to gain persistence or escalate privileges within the cloud directory. The rule monitors for unauthorized sign-ins, sensitive configuration changes (such as modifications to federation trust, authentication policies, or directory synchronization settings), and password resets targeting the sync account itself.
Detects the addition of passwords or certificates to Entra ID applications or service principals by an identity that is not currently listed as an owner. This behavior is a common persistence technique used by threat actors to maintain long-term access, bypass password resets, and circumvent MFA.
Detects modifications to Entra ID (formerly Azure AD) that disable security defaults, per-user MFA enforcement, or conditional access policies requiring MFA. Such actions remove tenant-wide MFA protection and are often precursors to account takeover, password spraying, or ransomware attacks.
Detects instances where a Service Principal or Enterprise Application is assigned a highly privileged Entra ID directory role (e.g., Global Administrator, Privileged Role Administrator). This behavior is often associated with adversary attempts to establish persistent access that survives remediation of human-managed identities.
Detects the assignment of high-privilege Azure directory roles to a service principal identity. Threat actors may leverage this behavior to establish persistent, non-interactive backdoor access in a cloud tenant, bypassing MFA and sign-in scrutiny.
Detects attempts by a principal to modify, stop, or delete AWS CloudTrail logging configurations. Such activity is a common indicator of defense evasion during the early stages of a cloud-based attack to prevent audit trail capture.
Detects modifications to cloud storage access control configurations in Azure (containers/blobs) and GCP (storage buckets) that result in public or unauthenticated access. The rule uses lookups to filter out approved public assets before alerting.
Detects high-volume or multi-type destructive operations against cloud backup, snapshot, and recovery infrastructure, including the disabling of immutability policies or soft-delete protections. This activity is consistent with ransomware actors attempting to eliminate recovery options before encrypting data.
Detects unauthorized modifications to Microsoft Entra Conditional Access (CA) policies, including deleting policies, disabling them, removing MFA requirements, or excluding specific users. These actions are common techniques used by adversaries to establish persistence or facilitate unauthorized access by weakening security controls.
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