Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps network, process command-line and URL-click telemetry for the Kimsuky payload C2 domain and its subdomains using an anchored match, which avoids lookalike or suffix-matching domains.
Detects when the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns command-line utilities or script interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, mshta.exe, wscript.exe, or cscript.exe. This behavior often indicates web application exploitation or webshell activity.
Detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading a DLL directly from common browser cache directories (Firefox, Chrome, or Edge), which is indicative of the SensePost cache-smuggling proof-of-concept technique.
Detects Java processes spawning PowerShell or Command Prompt to modify Windows Defender settings by adding exclusions for sensitive paths or extensions (such as AppData, Temp, Users Public, or ProgramData).
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects the execution of rm commands using force flags to delete multiple critical appliance, system, and web server log files simultaneously on Linux hosts.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects the execution of potential tunneling tools from temporary directories (/tmp, /dev/shm, /var/tmp) using characteristic CLI arguments such as --listen, --token, --obfs, and --ws-path, or the known binary name 'ingredi_ws'.
Detects potential Linux privilege escalation and persistence activities by monitoring for the creation of persistence scripts in post_boot.d, modifications to the sudoers.template file appending NOPASSWD, or system configuration rebuilds shortly after sudoers template changes.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects the execution of reverse engineering and decompilation tools such as JADX or Blutter against Android APK files or Flutter application binaries (libapp.so), as well as the creation of their typical output artifacts and staging folders.
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Detects when the IIS worker process (w3wp.exe) spawns common system and network discovery utilities such as whoami, ipconfig, systeminfo, net, and others, which may indicate web shell activity or post-exploitation discovery.
Detects network connections, process command-line executions, and email URL info matching known APT28 (Swallowtail, HOOKEDGE, LegionRelay) indicators of compromise, including specific IP addresses and GUIDs.
Sweeps network, process command-line and URL-click telemetry for the Kimsuky payload C2 domain and its subdomains using an anchored match, which avoids lookalike or suffix-matching domains.
Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
The following analytic detects the execution of the macOS osascript utility with AppleScript commands that display a dialog or alert containing potentially deceptive, credential-related, or security-themed content.
Adversaries may abuse osascript to present fake system messages or credential prompts and trick users into disclosing sensitive information.
This detection is based on command-line content and should be reviewed with the parent process, executing user, script content, and surrounding endpoint activity.
Adversaries may abuse osascript to present fake system messages or credential prompts and trick users into disclosing sensitive information.
This detection is based on command-line content and should be reviewed with the parent process, executing user, script content, and surrounding endpoint activity.
Detects commands run on an F5 BIG-IP appliance. BIG-IP terminates TLS for the
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
Detects a privileged command run through Centrify on Linux. Because elevation is
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects a CyberArk threat event carrying command-line content from a privileged
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
Detects commands or file-write activity that configures a Tor ExitPolicy matching distinctive policy templates (Policy A or Policy B), indicating potential Tor relay or bridge deployment.
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