Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects the creation or modification of specific files identified as indicators of compromise (IOCs) used by UNC4841 in their exploitation of Barracuda ESG appliances. These files are associated with various stages of the attack, including persistence, execution, and defense evasion.
Detects the creation or modification of a GitHub Actions workflow file that attempts to exfiltrate secrets. This pattern is associated with the Shai-Hulud worm, which injects malicious workflows to steal credentials using `toJSON(secrets)` and exfiltrate them using tools like `curl` and `base64`.
Detects modification of shell profile files (.zshrc, .bash_profile, .profile) by processes named 'applet' or 'qtop'. This is a fallback persistence mechanism used by the ChillyHell malware.
Detects the creation or modification of files with names suggesting they contain plaintext credentials, such as passwords or recovery codes. This is a common tactic used by threat actors to find and steal credentials for lateral movement and privilege escalation.
Detects a command-line interpreter (cmd.exe or powershell.exe) writing a file to a SharePoint (\TEMPLATE\LAYOUTS) directory.
Amcache.hve is a Windows registry file that logs details about executed programs, including file paths, hashes, timestamps, and metadata. It helps reconstruct what was run on a system—even if the original file is gone. On the other hand, Shimcache is a memory-resident registry artifact that records executables seen or run by the system. It stores file paths and last modified timestamps, making it useful for tracking historical program execution—even after deletion. Attackers aware of forensic techniques could try to delete or alter these files to remove the evidences of their attacks:
Deleting or wiping Amcache.hve Overwriting or tampering with the SYSTEM hive to destroy Shimcache Using tools like SDelete, cipher /w:, or direct registry access to tamper logs
Deleting or wiping Amcache.hve Overwriting or tampering with the SYSTEM hive to destroy Shimcache Using tools like SDelete, cipher /w:, or direct registry access to tamper logs
Detects attempts to replace the legitimate UEFI bootloader (bootmgfw.efi) with a malicious one by creating a backup (.old file) and modifying the original. This is a critical persistence technique used by the HybridPetya ransomware.
Detects modification of common macOS shell configuration files, a technique used by the ChillyHell backdoor for persistence.
Detects modifications to the default program associated with .txt files, specifically looking for changes to the 'open' command or 'UserChoice' registry keys. This can be indicative of an adversary attempting to establish persistence or execute malicious code when a user opens a text file.
Detects the s1ngularity malware attempting to add a shutdown command to shell configuration files (`.bashrc`, `.zshrc`) for persistence and system lockout.
Detects potential abuse of the Linux Magic SysRq (System Request) key by adversaries with root or sufficient privileges to manipulate or destabilize a system. Writing to /proc/sysrq-trigger can crash the system, kill processes, or bypass standard logging. Monitoring SysRq abuse helps detect stealthy post-exploitation activity.
This rule detects the PathWiper trojan by identifying specific byte patterns associated with its functionality. The patterns indicate the malware's capabilities to find volumes, enumerate files, discover shared network drives, and overwrite files, which are characteristic behaviors of wiper malware.
This rule detects suspicious file write and network activity that may indicate data exfiltration from a Windows Server using common tools like curl, ftp, or powershell. It correlates file creation/modification events with outbound network connections made by known exfiltration tools within a 5-minute window. This is useful for identifying insider threats, compromised servers, and automated exfiltration scripts.
Detects a variety of post-exploitation techniques observed in attacks leveraging SonicWall vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-40766). These techniques are associated with the Akira ransomware group and include defense evasion, credential access, and data staging.
Yara rule that detects PathWiper trojan.
Detects files based on common ransomware file extensions or ransom note filenames. This rule is based on a community-sourced list and is intended for broad detection.
This detection identifies the use of attrib.exe to remove hidden (-h) or system (-s) attributes from the Default.rdp file, which is automatically created in a user's Documents folder when a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session is initiated using mstsc.exe. The Default.rdp file stores session configuration details such as the remote host address and screen settings. Unhiding this file is uncommon in normal user behavior and may indicate that an attacker or red team operator is attempting to access or manipulate RDP connection history that was previously hidden—either by default or as part of an earlier anti-forensics effort. This activity may represent part of a broader pattern of reconnaissance or staging for credential reuse, lateral movement, or forensic analysis evasion. Monitoring for this behavior can help uncover suspicious manipulation of user artifacts and highlight interactive attacker activity on a compromised host.
This detection monitors the creation or modification of the Default.rdp file, typically found in the user's Documents folder. This file is automatically generated or updated by the Remote Desktop Connection client (mstsc.exe) when a user initiates an RDP session. It stores connection settings such as the last-used hostname, screen size, and other preferences. The presence or update of this file strongly suggests that an RDP session has been launched from the system. Since this file is commonly overlooked, it can serve as a valuable artifact in identifying remote access activity, including potential lateral movement or attacker-controlled sessions.
Detects the creation or modification of an unsigned Spotlight importer (.mdimporter) bundle within a user's Library/Spotlight directory on macOS. This activity is indicative of the Sploitlight TCC bypass technique (CVE-2025-31199), where an attacker leverages a malicious, unsigned importer to gain unauthorized access to TCC-protected data via the mds/mdworker processes.
This detection monitors the execution of 7zG.exe—the 7-Zip GUI executable—specifically when launched from the Traiolx Custom Utils or Kilo Verfair Tools directory under the user’s Roaming profile (\\AppData\\Roaming\\Traiolx Custom Utils). It identifies suspicious command-line activity where 7zG.exe is used to decrypt or extract a file named drata.dat, used to load second payload.
Detects the Chaos ransomware encryptor based on unique command-line arguments and embedded strings.
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