Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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IDS Classtypes
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Detects the execution of automated Nginx configuration modification scripts by identifying the use of 'csplit', 'awk', or 'sed' in close proximity to Nginx service management commands (reload, restart, or testing). This pattern is a hallmark of the 'bt.sh', 'zdh.sh', and '4zdh.sh' toolkits used to inject malicious proxy_pass directives.
This rule detects the presence of known malicious file hashes associated with a weaponized ScreenConnect RAT campaign, specifically targeting a fake ClawdBot VS Code extension. It monitors file and process events for these specific SHA256 hashes.
Chrysalis Backdoor SHA256 Hash Detection
Cortex XDR
This rule detects the presence or execution of the Chrysalis Backdoor by matching known SHA256 hashes of its components. It monitors file and process events for these specific hashes.
This query detects attempts to disable or modify critical security services using either the 'sc.exe' utility or direct registry modification. This is a common defense evasion technique used by adversaries to weaken a system's security posture before performing further actions.
Detects when the Windows Admin Center service ('SmeSvc.exe') is stopped, and shortly thereafter, a different process starts listening on the WAC port (TCP/6516). This behavior is a key indicator of CVE-2026-20965 exploitation, where an attacker impersonates the service to steal administrator access tokens.
This rule detects the presence or execution of known malicious infostealer files based on their SHA256 hash values or a specific filename pattern. The SHA256 hashes are associated with infostealer malware as referenced in a VirusTotal blog post. The filename pattern 'malwarebytes-windows-github-io' also indicates potential malicious activity, likely related to a deceptive download or execution.
SharpSuccessor is a .NET-based post-exploitation tool designed to weaponize the BadSuccessor attack discovered by Yuval Gordon (@YuG0rd) from Akamai. It allows a low-privileged user with 'CreateChild' permissions over any Organizational Unit (OU) in an Active Directory domain to escalate privileges to Domain Administrator. This detection rule identifies execution patterns or behavioral indicators linked to SharpSuccessor activity, which may signal privilege escalation attempts in Active Directory environments.
This rule detects files matching known SHA256 hashes associated with the VoidLink malware framework. This is a high-fidelity indicator with a very low chance of false positives.
Detects COLDDRIVER malware loading specific malicious DLLs (machinerie.dll, checkme.dll, iamnotarobot.dll) via rundll32.exe, or the loading of specific malicious DLLs identified by their SHA256 hashes.
This detection aims to identify suspicious popup activity on devices by analyzing process events that launch notifications. The query focuses on detecting referrers that generate multiple unique popup URLs, which could indicate potentially malicious behavior.
You can use this to check for potential browser popups generated by malicious sites gaining notification permission on a browser before they lead to further compromise of a host.
You can use this to check for potential browser popups generated by malicious sites gaining notification permission on a browser before they lead to further compromise of a host.
Detects execution of Windows LOLBins spawned shortly after a suspicious attachment is written to user accessible paths, a behavior commonly observed in spearphishing campaigns delivering malware loaders and ransomware.
Detects the presence of a file with a specific SHA-256 hash associated with a Linux Sliver TCP Pivot implant. This implant has been linked to the CL-CRI-1036 group and is used as a precursor to 01flip ransomware deployment. The rule searches across file and process events for this high-fidelity indicator of compromise.
This rule detects suspicious network connections to known malicious URLs associated with a Docker Desktop malware campaign. It also identifies instances where 'DockerDesktop.exe' is executed or present in unusual file paths, suggesting potential masquerading or unauthorized deployment outside of its standard installation directory. The rule is broken into three parts: network events, file events, and process events. The network part looks for connections to specific malicious domains. The file and process parts look for 'DockerDesktop.exe' in folders other than the assumed legitimate installation path, indicating potential malicious activity.
This rule detects the creation or modification of executable files with a single-character filename followed by '.exe' (e.g., 'a.exe', 'b.exe'). This pattern is often used by adversaries to evade detection or to make malicious files less conspicuous. The rule specifically excludes 'R for Windows front-end' to reduce false positives related to legitimate software.
Detects process execution from a deeply nested path containing a long sequence of underscores, a technique used by the ValleyRAT campaign to hide malicious components.
Detects use of the sysinfo system call in Linux, which provides a snapshot of key system statistics such as uptime, load averages, memory usage, and the number of running processes.
Malware or reconnaissance tools might leverage sysinfo to fingerprint the system - gathering data to determine if it's a viable target.
Malware or reconnaissance tools might leverage sysinfo to fingerprint the system - gathering data to determine if it's a viable target.
KQL Query from file: ConvertMate - suspicious PDF editor
Detects a network connection to an external SMB or WebDAV server immediately following the launch of a .url file. This behavior is associated with CVE-2024-43451, where threat actors use malicious .url files to leak NTLM hashes.
Detects process execution patterns associated with the "Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming" NPM supply chain attack. This includes the silent installation of the 'bun' runtime during an 'npm install' and a destructive file shredding command. The rule filters out legitimate manual installations by developers by checking the initiating parent process.
Detects the execution of mshta.exe with a URL containing a hex-encoded second octet in an IP address. This is a specific pattern observed in the initial access stage of the ClickFix malware campaign.
Detects when a user account is added to a local privileged group (sudo or wheel) on a Linux endpoint using the 'usermod' utility. This action grants the user administrative privileges and could be indicative of privilege escalation.
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