Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects ShadowSniff info-stealer based on strings, PDB path, and behavioral indicators.
This rule detects unusual network connections from processes to legitimate service endpoints that are commonly abused for Command and Control (C2) activities (LOLC2). It specifically looks for connections to services like Telegram, Slack, Discord, GitHub, Google APIs, Pastebin, Dropbox, and others, originating from processes that are not recognized as legitimate applications for those services, and not from common system processes or standard program file paths. This helps identify potential adversary communication channels masquerading as legitimate traffic.
Detects outbound network connections to the known typosquatted C2 domain (`scan.aquasecurtiy.org`) or associated IP address (`45.148.10.212`) used by the TeamPCP threat actor. This infrastructure was utilized during the Trivy supply chain attack for exfiltrating stolen SSH keys, cloud credentials, and CI/CD secrets.
MicroStealer Network IOCs
Cortex XDR
Detects network communication to known MicroStealer C2 domains or Discord webhook activity with a 'MicroStealer/1.0' user agent. This rule identifies potential MicroStealer malware activity within the network.
Detects network traffic matching the specific URI structure used by LeakNet for command-and-control beaconing. This behavior has been consistently observed across multiple LeakNet incidents following initial access.
Detects network traffic to known VOID#GEIST C2 domains hosted on TryCloudflare, or the specific command-line execution of `curl.exe` used to send a 'status=success' beacon. This activity confirms a successful compromise by the malware.
This detection identifies network requests matching a URL pattern used by the Coruna iOS exploit kit to deliver encrypted binary payloads. The framework generates resource URLs using a 40-character hash and serves them as files ending in ".min.js".
This rule detects network connections to a predefined list of known Microstealer malicious domains. These domains are often associated with malware command and control (C2) infrastructure, phishing, or other malicious activities. Monitoring connections to such domains can help identify compromised systems or active malware infections.
Detects network connections to known LLM/AI API endpoints from processes that are not standard web browsers. This is indicative of the LAMEHUG malware used by APT28, which leverages these APIs to dynamically generate and execute commands.
Detects network connections to domains identified as being part of the DarkSword iOS exploit kit delivery or command-and-control infrastructure. The DarkSword exploit kit is actively being used by multiple threat actors (UNC6353, UNC6748, PARS Defense) to target iOS users.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS traffic where the User-Agent string is explicitly set to 'MicroStealer/1.0', which is used by the malware when communicating with Discord webhooks or its C2.
This rule detects network connections to specific IP addresses and ports (1259, 1269) via UDP, or the presence of a file with a specific SHA256 hash. This combination could indicate command and control (C2) communication or data exfiltration using a custom UDP protocol.
Detects C2 communication from Boggy Serpens (MuddyWater) backdoors like Nuso and BlackBeard, which use non-standard HTTP status codes (201, 202, 418) to receive commands from known C2 servers.
This rule detects the presence of Phoenix malware by identifying known SHA256 hashes of its components or network connections to its command and control (C2) infrastructure. It correlates file events with known malware hashes and network events with known C2 IP addresses.
Detects network communication to known APT36 Havoc C2 infrastructure IP addresses
Detects the C2 communication of the Slopoly PowerShell backdoor, used by the Hive0163 group. It looks for specific HTTP POST requests containing a JSON body with characteristic keys.
This query detects multiple TTPs associated with the Storm-2561 campaign that uses SEO poisoning to distribute fake VPN clients for credential theft. It looks for known file hashes, a specific code-signing certificate, malicious DLL side-loading and C2 communication patterns.
This rule detects the creation of Amazon SNS (Simple Notification Service) subscriptions that are configured to send notifications to external HTTP or HTTPS endpoints. It specifically looks for `Subscribe` events from the `sns.amazonaws.com` service where the `protocol` is either `http` or `https` and the `endpoint` does not belong to Amazon's own domains (amazon.com, awsapps.com, amazonaws.com). This could indicate data exfiltration or misconfiguration where sensitive information might be sent to an unapproved external service.
This rule detects network traffic containing specific User-Agent strings used by the BurrowShell implant and the Rust-based keylogger to masquerade as legitimate Windows Update or browser traffic. These User-Agent strings are 'Windows-Update-Agent/10.0.10011.Client-Protocol/2.50' and 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; SecureNet/1.2)'.
Detects outbound network traffic to Icedrive domains from non-browser and non-Icedrive client processes, which could indicate C2 communication by the BeardShell implant used by Sednit (APT28).
Detects outbound network traffic to Filen domains from non-browser and non-Filen client processes, which could indicate C2 communication by Sednit's modified Covenant implant.
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