Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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DAI-SS EXPLOIT Possible React Exploit RCE Attempt Inbound (CVE-2025-55182)
Detects a distinctive User-Agent string used by the initial RedLoader DLL for command and control (C2) communications. This activity is associated with the GOLD BLADE threat group (also known as RedCurl).
This rule detects when a domain or URL observed in Teams Messages matches a known threat intelligence indicator from Microsoft Defender Threat Intelligence. It specifically looks for hits against 'Domain' and 'URL' type indicators.
Detects the unique User-Agent string "A WinHTTP Example Program/1.0" used by the MuddyViper backdoor for C2 communications, as reported in the MuddyWater campaign.
Detects network traffic consistent with RomCom's Mythic C2 framework. This includes connections to known C2 domains or requests for specific URI paths that return a 403 Forbidden status with an Nginx server header, a known fingerprint of this infrastructure.
KQL Query from file: ConvertMate - suspicious PDF editor
Detects network connections originating from notepad.exe to suspicious domains or IP addresses. This is a high-fidelity indicator of compromise associated with the SERPENTINE#CLOUD campaign, where a malicious payload is injected into the notepad.exe process for C2 communications.
Detects the download of a Java Archive (JAR) file initiated by a PDF reader or web browser, specifically from devices located in Uzbekistan. This behavior is characteristic of the Bloody Wolf threat actor's geofenced attacks.
Detects potential Command and Control (C2) communication from the AK47C2 backdoor over HTTP. The backdoor sends a hex-encoded JSON payload via HTTP POST requests. This rule specifically looks for HTTP POST requests with a request body longer than 100 characters that consists entirely of hexadecimal characters, indicative of the AK47C2 communication pattern.
This rule detects command-line activity indicative of downloading payloads from a Cloudflare Tunnel (`.trycloudflare.com`). This technique is used by the SERPENTINE#CLOUD threat actor to deliver malicious stages of their attack chain. The rule looks for common download utilities or specific WebDAV paths being invoked by command-line interpreters such as cmd.exe, powershell.exe, or pwsh.exe.
Detects network connections from Samsung Android devices that match the Command and Control (C2) patterns of the LANDFALL spyware. The rule identifies high-fidelity connections to known LANDFALL C2 IPs and domains, as well as lower-fidelity behavioral patterns, such as connections over HTTPS to non-standard ports.
Detects network connections to known Command and Control (C2) IP addresses associated with the LANDFALL Android spyware. While the spyware is known to target Samsung Android devices, this rule detects connections from any device to provide broader coverage against infrastructure reuse.
Detects the Kimsuky TTP of using legitimate cloud services like GitHub and Google Drive to download and subsequently execute malicious payloads, often using interpreters like mshta.exe or rundll32.exe.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS POST requests to known Lumma Stealer C2 domain
Detects outbound network connections from common messaging or gallery apps on Samsung Android devices to command and control (C2) infrastructure associated with the LANDFALL spyware.
Detects network traffic to a known Command and Control (C2) server (136.243.146.46:8898) associated with the YiBackdoor malware.
Detects HTTP/HTTPS communication to known FlexibleFerret payload hosting domains.
Detects network communication to known FlexibleFerret C2 infrastructure. The rule is valid.
Detects DNS or HTTP communication to known FlexibleFerret malware infrastructure domains.
This rule detects outbound HTTP traffic where the User-Agent header contains the string 'Internet Explorer'. This has been seen used by malware, and the legitimate Internet Explorer browser uses the User-Agent string "MSIE". The MSIE browser was end-of-lifed in 2022. The rule specifically looks for this pattern in established, to_server HTTP flows.
Detects activity associated with the Hannibal Stealer, a .NET info-stealer known for targeting cryptocurrency wallets, VPN configurations, and browser data.
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