Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects direct execution and testing of SAP Function Modules via SE37 test frame. This identifies correlation between a transaction start (AU7) and a function module call (BU4) in close succession
Detects modifications or creations of the SCNotification.exe.config configuration file associated with the Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/ConfigMgr) client by processes other than approved system tools such as ccmsetup.exe, msiexec.exe, or CcmExec.exe.
Hunts for NetScaler Pitboss packet engine messages where the text after NSPPE carries shell syntax such as separators, command substitution or ${IFS}. Security vendors observed this pattern during exploitation of the NetScaler pre authentication command injection flaw patched in September 2026.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The following analytic detects the execution of a process by `WmiPrvSE.exe`, indicating potential use of WMI (Windows Management Instrumentation) for process creation. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and parent process relationships. This activity is significant as WMI can be used for lateral movement, remote code execution, or persistence by attackers. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary commands or scripts, potentially leading to further compromise of the affected system or network.
Detects PowerShell execution performing port checks across multiple internal hosts using Test-NetConnection in a looping construct with output redirected to a log file, indicative of post-compromise reconnaissance (such as LONEPAGE scanning).
Detects the Mir0Auth phishing kit sequence within a single HTTP flow: POST /task_queue.cs beacon followed by POST /context.go device-code request, both with application/octet-stream bodies. Requires both requests (flowbits) and exact path endings to limit false positives. SIDs made unique.
Detects alternate PowerShell hosts potentially bypassing detections looking for powershell.exe
Detects crontab modifications or suspicious command execution spawned by the cron daemon on macOS devices, indicating potential persistence or scheduled task abuse.
Hunts for NetScaler Pitboss packet engine messages where the text after NSPPE carries shell syntax such as separators, command substitution or ${IFS}. Security vendors observed this pattern during exploitation of the NetScaler pre authentication command injection flaw patched in September 2026.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The query reads Syslog and CommonSecurityLog and decodes URL encoding. It checks only the text after NSPPE, so plain heartbeat lines without shell syntax do not match. The matching logic was checked on sample strings only, not on real appliance logs.
Triage: Check the source, the appliance version and whether it was patched at that time. A match on an unpatched appliance points to an exploitation attempt, not proof of success. Preserve logs and a snapshot before upgrading. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Needs NetScaler syslog forwarded to Sentinel. Empty results do not prove an appliance is clean. Attackers can remove traces and other techniques are not covered. Field names depend on the syslog format and connector. Bare separators and short words can match legitimate messages, so tune the regex after reviewing real results.
The following analytic detects the use of the Enable-PSRemoting cmdlet, which allows PowerShell remoting on a local or remote computer. This detection leverages PowerShell Script Block Logging (EventCode 4104) to identify when this cmdlet is executed. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attacker enabling remote command execution capabilities on a compromised system. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to take control of the system remotely, execute commands, and potentially pivot to other systems within the network, leading to further compromise and lateral movement.
The following analytic detects the execution of `wmic.exe` with the `node` switch, indicating an attempt to spawn a local or remote process. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it may indicate lateral movement or remote code execution attempts by an attacker. If confirmed malicious, the attacker could gain remote control over the targeted system, execute arbitrary commands, and potentially escalate privileges or persist within the environment.
The following analytic detects changes in the ScManager service security descriptor settings. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, specifically searching for any process execution involving the "sc.exe" binary with the "sdset" flag targeting the "scmanager" service. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges.
Hunts for sqlservr.exe spawning command shells or system utilities, a pattern consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse. It also flags later steps from a public intrusion write-up: certutil decoding, SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hive saves and local account or group changes.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Detects schtasks.exe creating a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection Service" that launches defender.exe (a renamed Sangfor executable abused for DLL sideloading) with SYSTEM privileges at startup. This is the exact persistence mechanism HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) uses to relaunch the CoolClient backdoor chain from the fake "Microsoft\Windows Defender" directory on every boot.
Hunting query, not intended as a scheduled alert.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Tested in a live Sentinel tenant with a test file. Copilot Cowork and Claude Code folder conventions not validated with live events; the Tool column is a label only and does not filter results. Matches files named SKILL.md in OneDrive and SharePoint only; local-only files and marketplace plugin skills are not visible.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that enumerate Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility exported commands
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
The following analytic detects the disablement of security steps in a CircleCI pipeline. It leverages CircleCI logs, using field renaming, joining, and statistical analysis to identify instances where mandatory security steps are not executed. This activity is significant because disabling security steps can introduce vulnerabilities, unauthorized changes, or malicious code into the pipeline. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to potential attacks, data breaches, or compromised infrastructure. Investigate by reviewing job names, commit details, and user information associated with the disablement, and examine any relevant artifacts and concurrent processes.
Detects cmd.exe spawned by a python.exe or pip.exe process with a command line invoking netstat or calc.exe. Matches the payload behavior described for the malicious redpy_demo PyPI package, whose __main__.py used Python's subprocess module to execute these commands via cmd.exe automatically at module invocation, without any direct victim interaction with the payload.
Detects a setx.exe process launched by python.exe or pip.exe with a command line referencing the PYTHONPATH environment variable. This matches setup.py build-time tampering that persistently rewrites the user's PYTHONPATH, redirecting future module resolution for the affected user to an attacker-controlled directory across all subsequent Python invocations.
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