Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Sweeps Defender XDR telemetry for known NEBULA / KNTRAT indicators (SHA256 hashes, C2 IP, decoy domain and URLs, burner publisher emails). Hash matching is scoped per table (execution hash only in process events), noisy tooling is excluded from command-line matches, network hits are limited to connection events, and results are aggregated per device and IOC.
The following analytic detects the execution of the macOS osascript utility with AppleScript commands that display a dialog or alert containing potentially deceptive, credential-related, or security-themed content.
Adversaries may abuse osascript to present fake system messages or credential prompts and trick users into disclosing sensitive information.
This detection is based on command-line content and should be reviewed with the parent process, executing user, script content, and surrounding endpoint activity.
Adversaries may abuse osascript to present fake system messages or credential prompts and trick users into disclosing sensitive information.
This detection is based on command-line content and should be reviewed with the parent process, executing user, script content, and surrounding endpoint activity.
Detects suspicious use of Node.js package managers running malicious lifecycle hooks, installing rogue dependencies, or invoking script execution during package installation.
Detects commands run on an F5 BIG-IP appliance. BIG-IP terminates TLS for the
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
applications behind it, which means the appliance holds private keys and sees
decrypted traffic — compromise of the load balancer is compromise of everything it
fronts, and the appliance itself rarely runs any endpoint agent.
Onboarding: F5BIGIP is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 81).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=auditd where sourcename='F5BIGIP' and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, process, commandline, processargs
Detects creation of a GitHub Actions workflow. A workflow executes code on runners
with access to repository secrets, so a malicious one is both a code-execution
primitive and a route to every credential the repository holds — a supply chain
foothold reached entirely through legitimate platform features.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='WORKFLOW_CREATED'
| groupby target, repositoryid, headbranch, operationtype
with access to repository secrets, so a malicious one is both a code-execution
primitive and a route to every credential the repository holds — a supply chain
foothold reached entirely through legitimate platform features.
Onboarding: GITHUB is ingested via GitHub connector (Bloo extractor 870).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/github-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=github where sourcename='GITHUB' and action='WORKFLOW_CREATED'
| groupby target, repositoryid, headbranch, operationtype
Detects a privileged command run through Centrify on Linux. Because elevation is
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
brokered, the platform records what was actually executed under elevated rights —
a cleaner record of privileged activity than shell history, which the user can edit.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX'
and action='USER_COMMAND_EXECUTED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, domain
Detects a CyberArk threat event carrying command-line content from a privileged
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
session. The platform flags the session as suspicious and simultaneously records what
was typed, which gives an unusually direct view of attacker behaviour inside a
privileged context.
Review the command line in full before judging severity; PAM sessions legitimately
carry administrative commands that look alarming out of context.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=threat where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='THREAT_DETECTED'
and commandline != ''
| groupby user, targetuser, commandline, process, srcip
Detects a process launch whose command line both references a cron persistence path (crontab, /etc/cron.d/, /etc/crontab, /etc/cron.{hourly,daily,weekly,monthly}/, /var/spool/cron/crontabs/) and contains a download-and-execute or reverse-shell marker (curl/wget piped to a shell, /dev/tcp/ redirection, base64-decoded payload, nc -e) or installs the crontab from a file staged under /tmp/. Attackers commonly install a scheduled cron entry so a malicious command re-executes on a fixed interval, surviving reboots and process kills (T1053.003).
Detects the launch of bad-bpf style eBPF rootkit loaders (pidhide with --pid-to-hide, sudoadd with --username) executed via sudo or from an interactive shell parent, representing the userspace step that issues bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD) before tracepoint hooks go live.
Detects an npm or pip package installation process spawning a script
interpreter or living-off-the-land binary (powershell, cmd, certutil, bitsadmin, curl,
wget, bash, sh) as a child process. CrowdStrike's 2026 Threat Hunting Report found
adversaries increasingly embed malicious setup/install scripts inside open-source packages
uploaded to npm and PyPI; these scripts execute automatically the moment the package is
written to disk during npm install / pip install, unless intercepted before execution. A
package manager process spawning a scripting engine or download utility immediately after
install is a strong indicator of an embedded malicious postinstall/setup script rather than
a normal build step.
interpreter or living-off-the-land binary (powershell, cmd, certutil, bitsadmin, curl,
wget, bash, sh) as a child process. CrowdStrike's 2026 Threat Hunting Report found
adversaries increasingly embed malicious setup/install scripts inside open-source packages
uploaded to npm and PyPI; these scripts execute automatically the moment the package is
written to disk during npm install / pip install, unless intercepted before execution. A
package manager process spawning a scripting engine or download utility immediately after
install is a strong indicator of an embedded malicious postinstall/setup script rather than
a normal build step.
Detects potential web shell activity where a web or application server process (such as IIS, Apache, Nginx, or Tomcat) writes a script file (e.g., .aspx, .jsp, .php) into a web-accessible directory, followed shortly by spawning a command-line shell or utility process.
Detects potential web shell activity where a web or application server process (such as IIS, Apache, Nginx, or Tomcat) writes a script file (e.g., .aspx, .jsp, .php) into a web-accessible directory, followed shortly by spawning a command-line shell or utility process.
Detects endpoint execution of specific known brute-force scripts and tools (such as ssh_brute.py, brute3.py, auto_login.py, etc.) using Python or shell interpreters, correlated with a high outbound network connection fan-out (50 or more distinct target IPs) from the same process.
Detects the AnyDesk Linux service running as root spawning a shell process (sh, bash, dash, zsh) or executing a command associated with the AnyPwn (CVE-2025-27918) post-exploitation behavior.
Detects potential DLL sideloading of DLLs that are part of antivirus software suchas McAfee, Symantec...etc
This rule performs a sweep across device file and network events for indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with the UAT-11587/Antino campaign. It detects malicious file hashes, specific C2 domain connections, and known lure URLs (HTA/WSF) identified by Cisco Talos.
Correlates a delivered PDF attachment with the same user's browser visiting Mir0Auth C2-style paths within 4 hours. Restricted to browser processes and successful connections, excludes dev/code-hosting domains, and matches users by mailbox alias (DeviceInfo LoggedOnUsers holds UserName, not full email).
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects instances where package managers (pacman, makepkg, yay, paru) or their children spawn a root shell that downloads and executes external scripts via curl or wget.
Detects PowerShell processes spawned by common managed file transfer (MFT) or web service processes (such as Serv-U, GoAnywhere, MOVEit, Cleo, Tomcat, etc.) performing remote system discovery or ingress tool transfer activities.
Detects suspicious command-line execution patterns involving 'ccmpwn', coercing features, or manipulation of Configuration Manager configuration files such as SCNotification.exe.config.
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