Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
8,395 detections
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Detects AWS API key creation for a user by another user.
Backdoored users can be used to obtain persistence in the AWS environment.
Also with this alert, you can detect a flow of AWS keys in your org.
Backdoored users can be used to obtain persistence in the AWS environment.
Also with this alert, you can detect a flow of AWS keys in your org.
Detects suspicious spawning of a process under a different user context than the parent process.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Processes such as notepad.exe, calculator etc. are generally spawned under the same user context and
also they are often targeted as sacrificial process or decoy process to check successful privilege escalation.
Detects the creation of a registry hive file (UsrClass.dat or NTUSER.DAT) outside of the standard user profile path.
These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user's profile directory.
Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings
for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting.
These files generally contain various user-specific registry settings and are typically located in the user's profile directory.
Staging these files outside of the standard path can be indicative of an attacker attempting to manipulate user registry settings
for persistence, privilege escalation, or dump user registry hives for credential harvesting.
Detects potentially suspicious explicit credential logon events where the user
is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are
different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting
to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account.
is trying to logon with explicit credentials (username and password) that are
different from the current user context. It might indicate an attacker attempting
to escalate privileges after obtaining credentials for a different user account.
Slack Anomalous Activity
Cortex XDR
This rule detects anomalous activity reported by Slack's internal anomaly detection system. This includes events such as impossible travel, new device access, suspicious IP changes, and other behavioral anomalies that Slack identifies. The rule extracts relevant user and context information for further investigation.
This rule monitors Zscaler web proxy logs to identify potential unauthorized account access by flagging two types of anomalous geographic activity: Impossible Travel (user access from two different countries within a short time window) and New Country for Identity (the first instance of an account accessing resources from a specific country).
This rule monitors Zscaler web proxy logs to identify potential unauthorized account access by flagging two types of anomalous geographic activity: Impossible Travel (user access from two different countries within a short time window) and New Country for Identity (the first instance of an account accessing resources from a specific country).
Detects creation of Windows registry hive files (ntuser.dat or UsrClass.dat) outside the expected user profile path hierarchy. LegacyHive writes a modified ntuser.dat to a GUID-named staging directory at C:\ root (e.g. C:\{GUID}\ntuser.dat) and copies UsrClass.dat there as well to set up the oplock-based race condition. Any hive file materialising outside C:\Users\ or C:\Windows\ is a strong indicator of this exploit chain or equivalent offline hive manipulation.
This rule monitors Okta system logs for lifecycle events related to inbound Identity Providers (IdP), specifically creation, modification, activation, deactivation, or deletion. It flags these changes when initiated by clients identified as proxies or associated with known abused ASNs. This activity is indicative of potential cross-tenant impersonation where an attacker with administrative access adds a malicious IdP to federate and impersonate organizational users.
Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts using the PowerShell 'Start-Process' cmdlet with the 'runAs' verb, which requests administrative privileges for a new process. The rule also includes a specific check for command-line artifacts associated with the 'wipe32' malware campaign, which utilizes this method for privilege escalation.
This rule detects potential OAuth Device Code Flow phishing attacks where users are directed to malicious lure pages on romnor[.]ca to enter a Microsoft device code. It also alerts on authentication activity associated with a specific malicious OAuth client ID (d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c) known to be used by a phishing backend to poll and claim OAuth tokens.
Detects the creation or modification of a file named 'g11.sys'. This filename is often associated with the deployment of malicious or vulnerable drivers used for kernel-mode exploitation, such as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD) attacks or rootkit activity.
Detects anomalous, automated data exfiltration cycles in Microsoft 365 environments consistent with the Helix threat group. The rule identifies a pattern of successful sign-ins followed within 6 hours by new MFA registration, suspicious SharePoint enumeration, and a high-frequency, non-human-paced burst of file downloads.
Detects suspicious use of the OAuth 2.0 device code authentication flow. The rule identifies potential token harvesting and phishing attempts by flagging device code sign-ins that originate from unusual user agents, unknown IP addresses or ASNs, unrecognized applications, or for users who have not previously utilized device code authentication. Legitimate, first-party applications like Azure CLI and Azure PowerShell are explicitly excluded to minimize noise.
This rule detects potential Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) activity related to a threat dubbed 'Rogue Planet'. It monitors for the creation of temporary files in the local AppData directory with a 'RP_' prefix and the usage of a specific named pipe named 'RoguePlanet'. The rule further isolates suspicious behavior by identifying processes that are not the standard Windows Error Reporting Manager (wermgr.exe) executing from its legitimate path.
This rule detects modifications or creation of registry values within the Windows 'Run' keys that specifically match known malicious persistence mechanism identifiers, such as 'MediumNetMonIt' or 'ZohoUsingUpdataAnyssAll_RunOnece'. These registry keys are frequently used by attackers to ensure malicious code executes automatically upon system boot or user logon.
Detects various stages of the Armored Likho APT campaign using the BusySnake stealer, including lure archive delivery, NSIS droppers, LNK shortcut abuse, PowerShell-based staging, VBScript persistence, scheduled task creation, reverse SSH tunneling, and exfiltration of browser and communication artifacts.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service where the service binPath points to 'anydesk.exe', optionally accompanied by a system reboot command within one hour of the service creation. This behavior is often associated with the installation or persistent configuration of remote access software.
This rule detects authentication attempts to the 'Device Registration Service' in Entra ID where the User-Agent string contains 'python'. This is often indicative of automated scripts, such as those using libraries like msal, being used to interact with device management APIs, which may be associated with legitimate automation or adversary activity.
Detects new device registrations in Microsoft Entra ID where the device display name is prefixed with 'Forg365-', a pattern used by the Forg365 PhaaS (Phishing-as-a-Service) platform. This activity is indicative of an adversary establishing persistent, unmanaged device access to compromised Microsoft 365 accounts.
This rule serves as an investigation framework for Microsoft Entra ID sign-in events. It enables security analysts to filter, normalize, and inspect user authentication activities, including sign-in types (interactive/non-interactive), device management status, user risk levels, and conditional access status. The query is designed for incident response and forensic analysis rather than automated alerting.
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