Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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1
Detects creation of a scheduled task named "Windows Defender Advanced
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Threat Protection Service" configured to run at system startup with SYSTEM privileges
and launch an executable named defender.exe. HoneyMyte (Mustang Panda) used this exact
schtasks command to establish boot persistence for the CoolClient backdoor sideloader,
masquerading the task and binary as a legitimate Windows Defender component.
Detects the loading of the 'truesight.sys' driver from non-standard or temporary locations. This activity is associated with a campaign where threat actors use a vulnerable version of this driver to terminate security products before deploying ransomware or RATs, a technique known as Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD).
Detects the default scheduled task activity of the hacktool Defendnot, which is used to disable Windows Defender Security.
It abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to register itself as a fake antivirus product, allowing it to disable Windows Defender.
During installation, Defendnot creates a scheduled task named 'defendnot' with the argument '--from-autorun' for persistence.
It abuses Microsoft's undocumented WSC API to register itself as a fake antivirus product, allowing it to disable Windows Defender.
During installation, Defendnot creates a scheduled task named 'defendnot' with the argument '--from-autorun' for persistence.
Detects external inbound FortiGate Fabric Management Protocol (FGFM) traffic on TCP port 541 followed by a FortiGateCloud administrative configuration download, backup, or running-config event on the same FortiGate device within a one-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized configuration access or device compromise.
Detects successful Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) sign-ins using the device code flow where the originating device is neither registered nor trusted (managed or compliant), which may indicate suspicious authentication attempts or token abuse.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in followed within 60 minutes by non-interactive replay from a different IP AND a persistence action (inbox rule, app consent, device add) from a non-original IP. Persistence is now mandatory (inner join) instead of optional, and the retired AADSignInEventsBeta table is replaced by EntraIdSignInEvents.
Detects the creation of a new Windows service (EventCode 7045) where the service binary path (ImagePath) points to the ProgramData directory, with exclusions for known legitimate paths such as Windows Defender, Package Cache, and Chocolatey.
Detects a role being added in Centrify for Linux. Roles determine which servers an
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
identity can reach and what it may do there, so adding one is a durable grant of
access to Unix infrastructure that frequently sits outside the scope of Windows
centric monitoring.
Onboarding: CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 822).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CENTRIFY-AUDITTRAIL-LINUX' and action='ROLE_ADDED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, domain
Detects a Slack login from a source address without prior history for that account.
A compromised Slack account gives an attacker the organisation's informal channel —
where credentials, links and internal detail are shared far more freely than in
email — and is an effective base for internal phishing.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SLACK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto, reason
A compromised Slack account gives an attacker the organisation's informal channel —
where credentials, links and internal detail are shared far more freely than in
email — and is an effective base for internal phishing.
Onboarding: SLACK is ingested via Slack native connector (Bloo extractor 833).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/slack
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SLACK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto, reason
Detects a privileged session launched from Secret Server. The launch is the moment
privileged access begins, and it carries the identity, the target and the source
address together — a cleaner attribution point than anything the target system will
record about a shared administrative account.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='LAUNCHED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
privileged access begins, and it carries the identity, the target and the source
address together — a cleaner attribution point than anything the target system will
record about a shared administrative account.
Onboarding: SECRET-SERVER is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 844).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=secretserver-secret where sourcename='SECRET-SERVER' and action='LAUNCHED'
| groupby user, file, filetype, srcip
Detects creation of an Atlassian API token. Tokens authenticate without a password
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
and without multi-factor, and they persist until revoked — which makes token creation
one of the most durable persistence mechanisms available on a SaaS platform holding
an organisation's project and documentation estate.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='API_TOKEN_CREATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, sitename, domain
Detects a privilege change within an Atlassian site. Confluence and Jira hold
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
architecture documentation, runbooks, credentials pasted into tickets and project
plans — so a privilege escalation here is a documentation-estate compromise, which
typically precedes a far more targeted attack elsewhere.
Onboarding: ATLASSIAN is ingested via NXLog (Bloo extractor 832).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/atlassian-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ATLASSIAN' and action='PRIVILEGE_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, group, sitename
Detects modification of user account attributes in Active Directory. Attribute
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
changes are how durable access is engineered quietly: disabling pre-authentication,
setting a service principal name, or clearing password expiry each weaken an account
without creating a new one for anybody to notice.
Onboarding: MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 830).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='MANAGE-ENGINE-ADAUDIT-PLUS'
and action='USER_ACCOUNT_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, accountdomain, category, role
Detects an endpoint or identity moving from a guest role to a corporate one. Guest
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
networks are deliberately segregated; a transition to corporate access means either
a legitimate onboarding or an attacker who entered through the least-controlled door
and found a way inward.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CISCO-ISE' and action='PASSWORD_CHANGED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
Detects modification of ISE configuration governing who may join the network and
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
under what conditions. A policy change is the most efficient way to grant durable
unauthorised access: rather than defeating the control repeatedly, the attacker
rewrites it once.
Onboarding: CISCO-ISE is ingested via Syslog (KV) (Bloo extractor 196).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='CISCO-ISE'
and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, policy
Detects a role modification shortly after failed authentication attempts for the same
identity. The sequence suggests someone unable to gain access through the front door
changing what the door permits, rather than continuing to try credentials.
Onboarding: ARUBA-CLEARPASS is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 261).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/aruba-clearpass
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ARUBA-CLEARPASS' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
identity. The sequence suggests someone unable to gain access through the front door
changing what the door permits, rather than continuing to try credentials.
Onboarding: ARUBA-CLEARPASS is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 261).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations/aruba-clearpass
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='ARUBA-CLEARPASS' and action='USER_UPDATED'
| groupby user, targetuser, role, srcip
Detects a privileged account authenticating to destinations outside its established
pattern. Privileged accounts are usually scoped to a defined estate — a database
admin reaches databases, not workstations. Appearance outside that scope is lateral
movement using legitimate credentials, which endpoint tooling will not flag.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, dstip, srcip, authproto
pattern. Privileged accounts are usually scoped to a defined estate — a database
admin reaches databases, not workstations. Appearance outside that scope is lateral
movement using legitimate credentials, which endpoint tooling will not flag.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, dstip, srcip, authproto
Detects use of a vaulted privileged credential from a source address with no prior
history for that account. Privileged accounts operate from a narrow and stable set of
jump hosts; a new origin means either an undocumented access path or an attacker
operating the credential from their own foothold.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_USED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, role
history for that account. Privileged accounts operate from a narrow and stable set of
jump hosts; a new origin means either an undocumented access path or an attacker
operating the credential from their own foothold.
Onboarding: CYBERARK is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 279).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=iam where sourcename='CYBERARK' and action='PASSWORD_USED'
| groupby user, targetuser, srcip, role
Detects any authentication attempt against a Smokescreen decoy asset. Decoys are not
published in directories, hold no business function and are never referenced by
legitimate automation, so an authentication attempt is attacker activity by definition
rather than something requiring interpretation.
This is the highest-signal, lowest-noise detection available on any log source: there
is no benign path to a decoy login.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
published in directories, hold no business function and are never referenced by
legitimate automation, so an authentication attempt is attacker activity by definition
rather than something requiring interpretation.
This is the highest-signal, lowest-noise detection available on any log source: there
is no benign path to a decoy login.
Onboarding: SMOKESCREEN is ingested via Syslog (CEF) (Bloo extractor 206).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='SMOKESCREEN' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects a privileged database login brokered through Arcon ARCOS from a source
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
address without prior history. ARCOS sits in front of database administrative access,
so it observes privileged DB sessions that database-native auditing often misses
entirely.
The extractor exposes a deliberately narrow field set — user, source address and
authentication protocol — so this detection is intentionally simple.
Onboarding: ARCOS-DBEVT is ingested via RDBMS Log Shipper (Bloo extractor 225).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/integrations
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=authentication where sourcename='ARCOS-DBEVT' and action='LOGIN'
| groupby user, srcip, authproto
Detects configuration changes to the PAM platform itself. Vault configuration governs
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
who may retrieve which credentials and what is recorded; altering it is how an
attacker grants themselves durable privileged access while suppressing the evidence
of having done so.
Changes made by an account that does not normally administer the vault are the ones
worth escalating.
Onboarding: PAM360 is ingested via Syslog (Bloo extractor 879).
Integration guide: https://bloo.io/docs/hypercloud/syslog-connector
BQL (Bloo Query Language):
stream=configuration where sourcename='PAM360' and action='CONFIGURATION_CHANGED'
| groupby user, config, srcip, role
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