Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects potentially malicious use of rundll32.exe by monitoring for execution from suspicious directory paths (e.g., Temp, AppData, Downloads), execution with arguments missing common legitimate entry points, unexpected network connections originating from rundll32.exe, or rundll32.exe spawning child processes (excluding known safe binaries like conhost.exe or werfault.exe).
Detects network exploitation attempts targeting Fortinet FortiOS and FortiProxy vulnerabilities (CVE-2024-55591, CVE-2025-24472) involving authentication bypass via HTTP header manipulation (Forwarded, X-Forwarded-For) and unauthorized access to the /jsconsole endpoint.
This rule identifies successful sign-in events using the Azure CLI application where multi-factor authentication (MFA) was not enforced. This is a potential indicator of a misconfiguration where sensitive cloud management interfaces are accessible via single-factor authentication, or a sign of an adversary attempting to leverage a less secure authentication pathway.
Detects modifications to the Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) InstallLocation registry key.
Attackers can modify this registry key to redirect the execution flow of legitimate WSL processes (wsl.exe or bash.exe) to a malicious payload, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Attackers can modify this registry key to redirect the execution flow of legitimate WSL processes (wsl.exe or bash.exe) to a malicious payload, acting as a proxy execution and defense evasion technique.
Detects instances where an identity associated with AI or automated agents (service accounts, service principals, bots, or assistants) is assigned to highly privileged administrative roles or security groups in the directory. This behavior potentially indicates an attempt to escalate privileges using a compromised or improperly configured agent identity.
Detects a suspicious pattern where a user authenticates to a remote access portal (like Citrix or VPN) without multi-factor authentication (MFA) or with an existing risk flag, followed by a surge in file activity (creation, modification, or renaming of >500 files or >200 distinct files) on the same account within a 24-hour window, potentially indicating compromised credential usage for staging data for exfiltration or ransomware.
This rule detects potentially compromised accounts by correlating risky Entra ID sign-ins to Citrix NetScaler with subsequent VPN session establishment followed by rapid, high-volume outbound connection activity from the source IP address. This pattern is indicative of a threat actor using compromised credentials to gain access via VPN and immediately perform internal network scanning or data staging.
The following analytic detects a user account modifying its own userPrincipalName (UPN) to match the sAMAccountName of another account via Windows Security Event 4738.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
This is the setup step of the ResetNightmare attack (CVE-2026-27912), where an attacker with WriteProperty rights on their own UPN attribute spoofs their identity to a target account.
The KDC then resolves a ptype=10 (NT-ENTERPRISE) Kerberos pre-authentication request against the spoofed UPN, issuing a kadmin/changepw TGT that can be used to change the target account's password via kpasswd (port 464).
Event 4738 is generated when a user account attribute is changed. This analytic filters to events where the SubjectUserSid equals the TargetSid (self-modification), the new UPN value is not a standard UPN (no @ sign), and the value is not a Windows placeholder.
A non-UPN value set on one's own account is anomalous and has no legitimate administrative use case.
Detects awk-based shell command construction on ESX BusyBox that interleaves
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
an esxcli/vim-cmd command string with invisible Unicode code points (zero-width space,
zero-width non-joiner/joiner, word joiner, Mongolian vowel separator, left/right-to-left
marks, or Plane-16 private-use characters generated via sprintf hex escapes), strips them
with gsub(), and passes the result to system(). CrowdStrike documented this as one of 21
validated ESX obfuscation techniques that leaves only the invisible-character-laden string
in shell logs while the executed command is fully hidden from cleartext review.
Detects the creation or modification of a local NetScaler administrative account with superuser (nsroot-level) privileges via the appliance CLI or management API. This activity is indicative of persistent administrative backdoors potentially established after the exploitation of vulnerabilities such as CVE-2026-88771 or CVE-2026-88772.
Detects a specific persistence chain attributed to DragonForce where the 'javaw.exe' process side-loads a malicious 'jli.dll' from a non-standard, user-writable directory. The rule correlates this DLL image load with the subsequent reading of an encrypted, host-bound payload file ('rvsdiqw.txt') by the same process, which is then decrypted and injected into memory.
Detects anomalous execution of PowerShell commands spawned by processes identified as 'javaw.exe' or 'GlobalTellurSync.exe' (associated with DragonForce backdoor activity). The detection focuses on instances where these processes launch from non-standard user-writable directories (e.g., AppData, Temp) and execute PowerShell commands that contain obfuscated arguments or payloads, while excluding standard scheduled task invocations.
Detects the GOST tunnel binary deployed as svchost.exe from a staging directory, identified by its known hash, or by an unsigned PE importing config.dll with a matching MZ header and embedded config.dll reference (reduces FPs from legitimately signed software that imports a DLL of the same name)
Detects execution of masqueraded wsl.exe binary.
Attackers can rename a malicious payload to wsl.exe to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Subsystem for Linux binary,
bypassing detection based on image name alone and abusing user trust in the WSL process name.
Attackers can rename a malicious payload to wsl.exe to masquerade as the legitimate Windows Subsystem for Linux binary,
bypassing detection based on image name alone and abusing user trust in the WSL process name.
Detects a system shell/interpreter copied or moved into a writable or non-standard path -
the precursor to the 'copy /bin/bash, set SUID, run bash -p' misconfiguration abuse and a
common staging step in the page-cache PoCs. Enriched with source/destination decode, an
inline-SUID-intent flag (chmod +s / chmod 4755 / install -m / setcap in the same command),
masquerade flags (renamed, hidden dotfile, system-lookalike name), a weighted RiskScore /
TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context. Pairs with OS-DET-LNX-006 and correlation
OS-DET-LNX-007. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
the precursor to the 'copy /bin/bash, set SUID, run bash -p' misconfiguration abuse and a
common staging step in the page-cache PoCs. Enriched with source/destination decode, an
inline-SUID-intent flag (chmod +s / chmod 4755 / install -m / setcap in the same command),
masquerade flags (renamed, hidden dotfile, system-lookalike name), a weighted RiskScore /
TriagePriority and DeviceInfo context. Pairs with OS-DET-LNX-006 and correlation
OS-DET-LNX-007. Detection logic adapted from Elastic Security Labs.
This rule monitors for high-impact configuration API calls and the creation of new administrator accounts within the Cisco Secure Firewall Management Center (FMC). These actions are indicative of post-exploitation activity related to CVE-2026-20079, which allows for authentication bypass. The detection focuses on sensitive administrative actions such as policy deployment, certificate exports, and user account creation which, if performed without valid session context, suggest an unauthorized actor.
This rule detects activities associated with the Star Blizzard (also known as APT28 or Callisto) group's CosmicPulse malware, specifically the downloader and Python-based backdoor. It monitors for suspicious CPL file execution via UNC paths by rundll32.exe or control.exe, unauthorized modifications to the HKCU\Software\Classes\.mollis registry key used for COM hijacking, and anomalous spawning of Python executables from control host processes in user-writable directories.
The following analytic detects cloud API calls executed by user roles that have not previously run these commands. It leverages the Change data model in Splunk to identify commands executed by users with the user_type of AssumedRole and a status of success. This activity is significant because new commands from different user roles can indicate potential malicious activity or unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized access, data breaches, or other damaging outcomes by exploiting new or unmonitored commands within the cloud environment.
This analytic detects network connections initiated by binaries that are not typically associated with network communication,
such as 'notepad.exe', 'calc.exe' or 'write.exe'.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information.
These applications are normally used for locally and do not require outbound network access. When they do initiate such connections, it may indicate process hollowing, code injection, or proxy execution, where adversaries abuse a trusted process to mask malicious activity.
such as 'notepad.exe', 'calc.exe' or 'write.exe'.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module logs to correlate network flow activity with process context, including command-line arguments, process path, and parent process information.
These applications are normally used for locally and do not require outbound network access. When they do initiate such connections, it may indicate process hollowing, code injection, or proxy execution, where adversaries abuse a trusted process to mask malicious activity.
This analytic detects system binaries that are commonly abused in process injection techniques but are observed without any command-line arguments.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
It leverages Cisco Network Visibility Module (NVM) flow data and process arguments
to identify outbound connections initiated by curl where TLS checks were explicitly disabled.
Binaries such as `rundll32.exe`, `regsvr32.exe`, `dllhost.exe`, `svchost.exe`, and others are legitimate Windows processes that are often injected into by malware or post-exploitation frameworks (e.g., Cobalt Strike) to hide execution.
When these processes are seen initiating a network connection with an empty or missing command line, it can indicate
potential injection and communication with a command and control server.
This analytic identifies the use of `msxsl.exe` initiating a network connection to a non-private IP address.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
Although `msxsl.exe` is a legitimate Microsoft utility used to apply XSLT transformations, adversaries can abuse it
to execute arbitrary code or load external resources in an evasive manner.
This detection leverages Cisco NVM telemetry to identify potentially malicious use of `msxsl.exe` making network connections
that may indicate command and control (C2) or data exfiltration activity.
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