Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Detects suspicious powershell download cradle using nslookup. This cradle uses nslookup to extract payloads from DNS records
Detects anomalous sign-in activity for users by comparing current successful login attempts against a 14-day historical baseline. The rule flags logins originating from new IP addresses, new applications, or new geographic locations, specifically identifying instances where at least two of these parameters deviate from the established historical norm for the specific user.
The following analytic detects the execution of hh.exe (HTML Help) spawning a child process, indicating the use of a Compiled HTML Help (CHM) file to execute Windows script code. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where hh.exe is the parent process. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious scripts via CHM files, a known technique for bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized code execution, potentially compromising the system.
Hunts for sqlservr.exe spawning command shells or system utilities, a pattern consistent with xp_cmdshell abuse. It also flags later steps from a public intrusion write-up: certutil decoding, SAM, SYSTEM or SECURITY hive saves and local account or group changes.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Results are grouped per device and day and ranked by stage count. Rows can also appear without a SQL parent when two later stages occur on the same device and day.
Triage: Some jobs use xp_cmdshell legitimately. Review the command line and the account. Hunting query, not an alert.
Limitations: Activity inside the SQL process with no child process is not visible. Renamed tools, obfuscation and privilege escalation tools are not covered. Needs Defender for Endpoint on the SQL servers.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Behavioral hunt for accounts whose non-interactive sign-ins over 30 days are dominated (>=95%) by a single IP using a scripted client (python/aiohttp/httpx/urllib) with no browser. Scripted now requires BOTH no browser AND a scripted user agent, and Microsoft ASN egress is excluded.
Detects a process other than XBootMgr.exe spawned by XBootMgrSleep.exe.
XBootMgrSleep.exe is a Microsoft-signed Windows Performance Toolkit binary that can execute an arbitrary executable after a delay.
XBootMgrSleep.exe is a Microsoft-signed Windows Performance Toolkit binary that can execute an arbitrary executable after a delay.
Detects obfuscated PowerShell scripts that enumerate Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility exported commands
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
and invoke cmdlets indirectly by array index. This can be used to evade detections
that look for explicit strings such as Invoke-RestMethod or Invoke-Expression.
Detects payload staging activity associated with threat actor UAC-0099, correlating the creation or modification of executable/DLL files in disguised LocalAppData directories with decoy images or library configuration files within a one-hour window.
Detects the usage of command-line flags in AI coding assistant CLIs (such as Claude Code, Amazon Q CLI, and others) that intentionally skip security permissions, bypass approvals, or disable sandbox protections. The rule identifies potential developer activity that may inadvertently reduce the security posture of the development environment.
Detects a setx.exe process launched by python.exe or pip.exe with a command line referencing the PYTHONPATH environment variable. This matches setup.py build-time tampering that persistently rewrites the user's PYTHONPATH, redirecting future module resolution for the affected user to an attacker-controlled directory across all subsequent Python invocations.
Detects a successful device-code sign-in whose session is replayed successfully within 60 minutes from a different IP and ASN. Only successful replays count (interrupt codes removed) and Microsoft first-party ASN egress is excluded.
Detects agentic AI jailbreak attempts that try to establish persistent control over M365 Copilot through rule injection, universal triggers, response automation, system overrides, and persona establishment techniques. The detection analyzes the PromptText field for keywords like "from now on," "always respond," "ignore previous," "new rule," "override," and role-playing commands (e.g., "act as," "you are now") that attempt to inject persistent instructions. The search computes risk by counting distinct jailbreak indicators per user session, flagging coordinated manipulation attempts.
Lists accounts that still sign in successfully with Authenticated SMTP over the last 30 days. Microsoft plans to disable Basic auth for SMTP AUTH by default for existing tenants at the end of December 2026.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
Lists accounts that still sign in successfully with Authenticated SMTP over the last 30 days. Microsoft plans to disable Basic auth for SMTP AUTH by default for existing tenants at the end of December 2026.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
Rows come from SigninLogs and AADNonInteractiveUserSignInLogs, grouped per account with source IP count, apps and first and last seen.
Triage: Find the owner of each account, then move the sender to OAuth or a mail relay before the change. Inventory query, not an alert.
Limitations: Covers only sign-ins that reach the logs. Cross check with the Exchange admin center SMTP AUTH Clients Submission Report, which keeps 90 days.
This rule detects a classic port knocking sequence followed by a connection to sensitive services (SSH, Telnet, RDP, VNC, WinRM). The rule identifies devices performing rapid connections to multiple different ports within a short window, which is indicative of a port knocking attempt used to trigger service exposure, followed by an immediate attempt to connect to that exposed service.
The following analytic identifies system processes running from unexpected locations outside of paths such as `C:\Windows\System32\` or `C:\Windows\SysWOW64`. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process paths, names, and hashes. This activity is significant as it may indicate a malicious process attempting to masquerade as a legitimate system process. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic identifies potential DLL search order hijacking or DLL sideloading by detecting known Windows libraries loaded from non-standard directories. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to monitor DLL loads and cross-references them with a lookup of known hijackable libraries. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to execute malicious code by exploiting DLL search order vulnerabilities. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment.
The following analytic identifies the use of protocol handlers executed via the command line. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant because protocol handlers can be exploited to execute arbitrary commands or launch applications, potentially leading to unauthorized actions. If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use this technique to gain code execution, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment, posing a significant security risk.
The following analytic detects the use of Microsoft HTML Application Host (mshta.exe) to make remote HTTP or HTTPS connections. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line arguments containing URLs. This activity is significant because adversaries often use mshta.exe to download and execute remote .hta files, bypassing security controls. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow attackers to execute arbitrary code, potentially leading to system compromise, data exfiltration, or further network infiltration.
The following analytic identifies child processes spawned from "mshta.exe". It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on specific child processes like "powershell.exe" and "cmd.exe". This activity is significant because "mshta.exe" is often exploited by attackers to execute malicious scripts or commands. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence within the environment. Monitoring this activity helps in early detection of potential threats leveraging "mshta.exe" for malicious purposes.
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