Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
3,651 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
1,772
374
351
273
255
Contributors
908
676
593
359
164
Categories
1,505
1,172
782
528
524
Platforms
39,960
7,270
6,537
3,868
3,651
Products / Services
809
512
432
340
300
MITRE Techniques
1,181
584
528
506
438
CVEs
17
16
9
8
7
IDS Classtypes
41
15
10
6
5
IDS Protocols
47
24
3
2
1
Detects the AMOS Stealer archiving collected data using the 'ditto' command with specific flags and output file names. This rule identifies the use of '-c', '-k', and '--sequesterRsrc' flags, along with '/tmp/osalogging.zip' or '/tmp/out.zip' as target archive names, which are characteristic of AMOS Stealer's data staging and archiving behavior.
This rule detects the execution of JavaScript files named 'bw_setup.js' or 'execution.js' using the 'bun' runtime, immediately followed by an outbound network connection to the command and control (C2) domain 't.m-kosche.com'. The detection logic correlates process execution events with network connection events within a 10-minute window, indicating potential malicious activity associated with supply chain attacks.
Detects the use of `wget` or `curl` to specifically target a GitHub API endpoint with a suspicious string, indicating an attempt to download initial stage malware or tools from a dead drop. This pattern is associated with supply chain attacks where GitHub is used as a temporary hosting for malicious components.
This rule detects the creation of a '.pkg_history' file, which is a known indicator of the Mastra NPM supply chain compromise, followed by a network connection to specific command and control (C2) IP addresses (23.254.164.123 or 23.254.164.92) within a 5-minute window on the same device. This correlation aims to identify successful exploitation and subsequent C2 communication by the Mastra NPM malware.
This rule detects the execution of specific Node.js scripts (`setup.cjs` or `protocal.cjs`) that are associated with the Mastra npm supply chain attack. It identifies Node.js process executions across Windows, macOS, and Linux, looking for these malicious script names in the command line.
Detects rclone copy, sync, move, or copyto operations with options commonly used for unattended bulk transfer, indicating potential data exfiltration to cloud storage.
Detects OAuth token theft via malicious redirect URI manipulation
Detects exfiltration of sensitive data pushed to GitHub repositories
Identifies Storm-1175 utilizing the rclone utility (often renamed) with MEGA or Mega-CMD configurations to exfiltrate vast data troves before encryption.
Correlates the creation of randomized staging directories /tmp/shub_ indicating SHub Stealer activity.
Detects the creation of specific staging paths utilized by AMOS to organize stolen artifacts before archiving.
This rule detects a rapid sequence of host profiling commands commonly used by the AMOS malware to gather system information, specifically to generate the hardware UUID of the victim machine. It looks for the execution of 'whoami', 'id', 'hostname', and 'ioreg' commands within a 10-second window, requiring at least three distinct commands from this set, with 'ioreg' being a mandatory component.
Detects a module changing protocol, destination class, or cloud service after repeated failed connections on its primary channel. This behavior is indicative of malware like Kazuar attempting to establish C2 communication through alternative means when its initial attempts fail.
Correlates the downloading of the secondary Mach-O backdoor (.mainhelper) into the user's home directory as a hidden file.
Detects connections to cryptocurrency mining pools
Detects a persistent process creating similarly sized outbound transfers at regular intervals after staging local results, indicative of the Kazuar malware's exfiltration behavior. The rule identifies processes with significant outbound network traffic (bytes > 10000), aggregates this traffic over 15-minute intervals, and then looks for processes that exhibit consistent outbound activity with intervals between 10 and 20 minutes (600 to 1200 seconds).
Detects files or processes matching SHA256 indicators published by Google Threat Intelligence Group for the INFINITERED campaign. The hashes cover the help.php persistence component, credential harvesters, backdoors, and droppers. A match should be treated as a high-confidence indicator of compromise and investigated immediately.
Detects the creation of a new deviceManagementScript or deviceShellScript object in Intune, indicating a PowerShell (Windows) or Shell (macOS/Linux) script has been uploaded to the Intune management platform. This is considered a high-fidelity indicator of script-based abuse as these scripts execute as SYSTEM on targeted endpoints and leave minimal forensic traces. The rule also identifies script creation initiated by service principals that might bypass human-UPN-based monitoring.
Shebangs (#!) are native to Unix-like operating systems (macOS and Linux). Standard Windows consoles (Command Prompt and PowerShell) do not natively use them. However, they do work on Windows when using tools such as the Python Launcher, Git Bash, Cygwin, or Unix-like environments such as WSL. In simple terms, a Shebang tells the operating system which interpreter should execute a script. For example: #!/usr/bin/python3
Distinct scripts can not look dangerous based on their extension, but they are still executable files. In environments with macOS, Linux, WSL, Git Bash or Python Launcher, this can help to identify scripts renamed to hide their real purpose.
Distinct scripts can not look dangerous based on their extension, but they are still executable files. In environments with macOS, Linux, WSL, Git Bash or Python Launcher, this can help to identify scripts renamed to hide their real purpose.
Detects the creation or modification of Git pre-commit hooks (.githooks/pre-commit). Contagious Interview actors use this technique to automatically execute malicious code when a target clones and interacts with a compromised repository.
Detects unauthorized reading of the GitHub CLI hosts.yml file by processes other than standard development tools (gh, gh.exe, code). This activity could indicate an attempt to steal authenticated GitHub sessions, as the hosts.yml file contains sensitive GitHub authentication tokens.
Page 137 of 174