Detections
Explore public detection logic contributed by the community across SIEM and rule languages.
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Correlates a high-risk or compromised Microsoft Entra sign-in event with a subsequent device registration (Add device or Register device) performed by the same user account within a 3-hour window.
Correlates an interactive MFA-satisfied user sign-in with a subsequent non-interactive or token-based successful authentication from a different IP address and country within a short time window for the same user and application. This pattern is indicative of adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) phishing attacks where session cookies or tokens are intercepted and replayed.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects a potential password spraying attack characterized by multiple authentication failures across numerous users from a single IP address, followed by a successful sign-in from that same IP, culminating in a privileged role or credential change performed by the compromised account.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects Microsoft 365 token replay from the Huntress token spray and replay campaign. Alerts on sign-ins from an IP new to the account (not seen on 3 or more distinct days in the 14d baseline) that match one of three behaviors: a scripted client (node or bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent with Office or Authentication Broker client IDs), Device Registration Service access (Medium-High only when corroborated by a campaign IP, scripted user agent or session IP hop, otherwise Low), or one session moving across IPs within 60 minutes. Rows are raised to High when the same new IP hits 3 or more baseline accounts in the window (token spray pattern) or matches a campaign IOC. Low Signal rows are dropped when AlertOnly = true. Does not cover MFA changes, device registration events or inbox rules.
Detects user accounts that have been disabled for an extended period (greater than 100 days), which could potentially be abused or overlooked.
Detects successful Entra ID sign-ins using the device code authentication flow by users who have no prior device code sign-in history within a 30-day baseline window. This behavior can indicate device code phishing or abuse of the device code grant mechanism.
Detects Microsoft 365 session token replay as described in the Huntress token spray research: sign-ins from the campaign addresses, scripted clients (node or a bare Mozilla/5.0 user agent) using the Office, Authentication Broker or OfficeHome app IDs from an address new to the account, Device Registration Service access from a new address and one session seen from different operating systems and addresses. The campaign address list is short lived and serves as enrichment.
This rule aggregates software inventory, vulnerability assessments, network connection events, and exposure graph data to prioritize patching and identify internet-facing devices running PHP with known vulnerabilities or active web listeners.
Detects a high volume of authentication failures followed by a successful authentication from the same source IP address against edge devices like FortiGate or Palo Alto GlobalProtect within a specific time window.
Detects password spraying activity against Azure Active Directory / Microsoft 365 services where a single source IP attempts to authenticate against numerous distinct user accounts with low attempt counts per account and sustained over time, while excluding successful authentication IPs.
Detects the presence of known malicious or suspicious OAuth application IDs as well as specific third-party applications like SkyKick or ConnectWise within OAuth application metadata over a 30-day window.
Audit query that finds enabled OAuth apps in Microsoft Entra ID holding permissions an attacker would want: reading or sending mail, accessing files and sites, planting credentials on other apps, assigning roles, or changing Conditional Access. App-only permissions (the app signs in as itself, with no user and no MFA) are split from delegated ones. High-privilege delegated grants are flagged only for external apps with no verified publisher, the typical consent-phishing shape. Output is one row per app with a plain-language ReviewReason, publisher, origin, admin consent, activity (Inactive 90d+ is the easiest to disable) and “(in use)” markers on permissions the app actually exercises, so a review team can decide to keep, reduce or disable.
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
Detects Microsoft Entra ID sign-ins to specific third-party applications related to Updraft (TeamUpdraft, UpdraftCentral, UpdraftVault, UpdraftClone, UpdraftPlus) with anomalous characteristics such as multi-IP access, distinct countries, or failed-then-successful access attempts, indicating possible credential compromise or misuse.
Audit query that finds enabled OAuth apps in Microsoft Entra ID holding permissions an attacker would want: reading or sending mail, accessing files and sites, planting credentials on other apps, assigning roles, or changing Conditional Access. App-only permissions (the app signs in as itself, with no user and no MFA) are split from delegated ones. High-privilege delegated grants are flagged only for external apps with no verified publisher, the typical consent-phishing shape. Output is one row per app with a plain-language ReviewReason, publisher, origin, admin consent, activity (Inactive 90d+ is the easiest to disable) and “(in use)” markers on permissions the app actually exercises, so a review team can decide to keep, reduce or disable.
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
This is an inventory of what apps can do, not a change detector. A verified publisher does not mean safe, as the ConnectWise/SkyKick credential abuse showed. Pair it with audit-log hunting for new secrets and role assignments. Requires OAuthAppInfo (app governance in Defender for Cloud Apps).
Detects potential Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) fatigue or push bombing attacks against Azure Active Directory (Entra ID) accounts by identifying a high volume of MFA failures followed by suspicious or fraudulent report actions, or successful authentications shortly after repeated failures.
Detects instances where a web browser accesses a domain listed in the 'AdFection_Domains' watchlist, followed closely by the browser spawning a script interpreter (such as PowerShell, wscript, cscript, mshta) or dropping an executable/script file in user profile or temporary directories.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects abnormal PHP execution volume storms, process crashes handled by crash reporters (such as werfault.exe, apport, systemd-coredump), or application error events related to PHP, which may indicate denial of service attacks, exploitation attempts, or severe application instability.
Detects endpoint, network, and security log activity matching known indicators of compromise (IOCs) associated with PEERSTITCH / CL-STA-0954, including specific file hashes, IP addresses, and URLs.
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