ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,023 views
727 detections
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Detects rare, non-system, non-browser processes opening a TCP listening connection on port 56793, which is associated with the rat_http3_cc embedded local HTTP server. Excludes processes that have a baseline of being seen listening on this port across multiple devices.
Detects potential device-code phishing attacks where a user successfully authenticates using the device code flow from one IP address, followed shortly by a successful sign-in from a different IP address using the same user account, indicating an attacker has redeemed the stolen device code token.
Detects unauthenticated HTTP POST requests targeting config.lua or cgi-bin/config endpoints over plaintext HTTP, typically associated with vulnerability scanning or exploitation attempts.
Detects the execution of a Python implant script (main.py) via python.exe or pythonw.exe from the SYSTEM user profile, correlated with a matching Windows Registry Run key persistence mechanism.
Detects a web server worker process (PHP, Apache, Nginx) writing a script file into a web directory, followed by the same web process spawning a shell process with suspicious command line arguments within 1 hour.
Detects a sequence where a remote host performs a network probe using netcat or curl with specific flags, followed shortly by downloading a known malicious RAT binary from the same remote IP address.
Detects behavior where a PowerShell process (powershell.exe or pwsh.exe) drops an executable named client32.exe into a user profile path and establishes persistence by writing a registry value under the CurrentVersion\Run key pointing to it.
Detects a PowerShell command line execution that builds a GUID-named .ps1 script in the TEMP directory, downloads content into it using curl/Invoke-WebRequest, and subsequently launches a hidden PowerShell process with execution policy bypass to run that same script.
Detects the creation of a Windows scheduled task using schtasks.exe that executes a PowerShell script located in the C:\ProgramData\ssh directory or uses known indicators such as the 'WinUpdCheck' task name or 'winc.ps1' script reference, associated with CACTUS ransomware persistence.
Detects Qlik Sense service processes (scheduler, engine, proxy, repository) spawning or dropping remote access tools such as AnyDesk or Plink, a behavior observed in CACTUS ransomware campaigns.
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