ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,023 views
727 detections
Filters
Last updated
All Time
Detection languages
666
58
2
1
Categories
333
278
133
79
78
Platforms
472
246
86
47
40
Products / Services
362
39
38
38
32
MITRE Techniques
259
166
147
134
124
CVEs
5
3
3
3
3
IDS Classtypes
2
IDS Protocols
2
Detects behavior associated with the Bitter APT group where system reconnaissance commands are executed via command shells (powershell, cmd), staged into a local file named 'abc.pdf' using output redirection, and subsequently uploaded/exfiltrated using curl within a 30-minute window.
Detects a sequence where a Windows Defender exclusion is added via PowerShell or Command Prompt, followed by a silent installation of an 'app.msi' package on the same device within 30 minutes. Management agents and noisy administrative devices are filtered out to reduce false positives.
Detects the creation of scheduled tasks that pipe log files into cmd via conhost --headless, often associated with BITTER PapRAT activity, optionally accompanied by curl staging within 10 minutes.
Detects PowerShell execution registering a logon scheduled task at the highest run level, executing a binary from the ProgramData Oracle Java path (such as jhost.exe or Java rpchost agent).
Detects behavioral patterns where built-in Windows downloaders and living-off-the-land binaries such as certutil, BITSAdmin, curl, or PowerShell WebClient are used to download content or communicate with a known C2 IP while writing files into sensitive directories like ProgramData or AppData.
Detects the execution of wevtutil.exe to clear TerminalServices-LocalSessionManager and/or TerminalServices-RemoteConnectionManager operational logs, which is a technique used by adversaries to hide remote access and session activity.
Detects behavior where the SQL Server process (sqlservr.exe) spawns commands containing multiple OLE automation / ADODB.Stream markers (such as ADODB.Stream, SaveToFile, sp_OACreate, sp_OAMethod, WScript.Shell) or writes executable files directly into sensitive directories such as the Public or Startup folders.
Detects instances of the dbus-daemon binary executing from outside standard system binary directories (such as /usr/bin, /bin, etc.) while excluding common container paths, snap mounts, and locations seen in a 30-day historical baseline. This behavior can indicate potential Masquerading or execution of a modified/implanted copy (e.g., associated with eBPF-based rootkits or custom implants).
Detects uncommon or non-prevalent processes invoking the PTRACE_ATTACH API call against target processes, which could indicate process injection or debugging activities by unauthorized tools.
Detects processes listening on or accepting inbound connections at loopback port 8738, which is associated with the GhostMap/IronWorm local collector on Linux systems. Excludes standard packaged-software paths and common baseline processes.
Page 13 of 73