ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
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727 detections
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Detects rare, non-system, non-browser processes opening a TCP listening connection on port 56793, which is associated with the rat_http3_cc embedded local HTTP server. Excludes processes that have a baseline of being seen listening on this port across multiple devices.
Detects Node-RED admin API flow deployments (POST /flows) where the payload contains an 'http in' node, a 'function' node, an 'exec' node, and 'addpay' enabled, which can indicate malicious workflow deployment or command execution attempts.
Detects successful device-code authentication flow completions using the Microsoft Authentication Broker client, which is frequently targeted or abused in phishing attacks bypassing traditional MFA.
Detects execution of the SpikeStrip CLI via Node.js with dynamic provider configurations for OpenAI or Anthropic, correlated with outbound network connections to their respective public APIs from the same node process.
Detects a sequence where a service principal successfully signs in from a suspicious or actor-linked IP address (including known Tor exit nodes), followed closely (within 1 hour) by Key Vault secret read operations (SecretGet or SecretList) originating from the same IP address.
Detects a suspicious execution chain where a LNK file executed from a mounted VHDX launches cmd.exe, opening a decoy .xls/.xlsx file while simultaneously launching a silent MSI installation using msiexec.
Detects potential User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts or privilege elevation loops initiated by node.exe, electron.exe, or Swarm Desktop.exe, followed by suspicious post-elevation actions such as modifying Defender preferences, executing msiexec with app.msi, or invoking ScreenConnect Client.
Detects cross-account AWS AssumeRole activity from an external account followed by extensive Amazon S3 enumeration and read (GetObject) operations within a 12-hour window, potentially indicating unauthorized data access or exfiltration.
Detects when a non-system process creates a named pipe with a non-standard name, followed within 10 minutes by an inbound SMB connection (port 445) from another host to the same device. This behavior can indicate lateral movement or post-exploitation framework activities like Adaptix using named pipes and SMB.
Detects PowerShell execution of an executable from the Temp directory with a randomly generated name and long base64-like encoded arguments, characteristic of Metro4Shell activity.
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