ills3c Intel&Coffee
@Ills3CUS MidwestCompletionist
0 followers820 downloads3,277 copies25 likes12,024 views
727 detections
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Detects potential credential theft and staging on macOS where plaintext login credentials are written to disk (~/.passphrase and ~/.txid) by osascript or related shell processes, often accompanied by or following a local dscl authonly check.
Detects the Phexia macOS dropper persistence mechanism where a shell script writes a plist file into ~/Library/LaunchAgents, reloads it using launchctl, and subsequently executes a base64 encoded payload piped into osascript via a shell interpreter.
Detects PowerShell and msiexec activity referencing AgtaBackupAgent.msi where the parent process or initiator is associated with known Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tools such as LogMeIn Resolve, ConnectWise ScreenConnect, Ops RMM, or TraceRMM.
Detects a suspicious sequence on Linux systems where executable permissions are added to a file located in a world-writable directory (/tmp, /var/tmp, /dev/shm), followed by the execution of that same dropped or hidden file, optionally followed by cron persistence within a specified timeframe.
Detects inbound emails originating from consumer email domains with no URLs or attachments, containing invoice-related subjects, which are often used as pretext emails for vishing campaigns.
Detects the curl followed by a silent msiexec installation sequence, often used to deploy RMM agents or other payloads. It checks either a single command-line chain or a multi-step sequence within a 10-minute window.
Detects suspicious curl commands spawned from shell processes on CI runners (such as GitHub Actions) that encode and POST environment variables using command substitution.
Detects Claude Desktop or its spawned child processes (such as node, python, or shell interpreters) accessing two or more distinct credential or sensitive configuration paths (such as SSH keys, AWS credentials, npmrc, etc.) within a 10-minute window on the same device.
Detects a multi-stage execution pattern associated with the Bitter APT group, where ftp.exe is first used to download resource files (icon.ico or res.ico), followed closely within 15 minutes by the creation of a scheduled task utilizing PowerShell/cmd or command execution referencing those resource files.
Detects a sequence where a file is dropped into a hidden .solidity directory followed by the creation of a persistence artifact (such as a systemd user unit or macOS LaunchAgent) on the same device within one hour.
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